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The Legality of an Independent Quebec: 
Canadian Constitutional Law and Self-
Determination in International Law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the signing of the Treaty of Paris (Treaty) on February 10, 1763,1 
which formalized the British position in Canada and in other lands on the 
North American continent,2 members of the French-Canadian community, 
1. Definitive Treaty of Peace Between France, Great Britain and Spain, Feb. 10, 1763, Great 
Britain-France-Spain, 42 Parry's T.S. 320. The Treaty settled various territorial disputes at the 
conclusion of the War of 1756-63 (Seven Year's War). As part of the settlements, the King of 
France ceded to Great Britain all of its possessions in Canada. /d. art. IV. By granting dominion 
to Britain over Canada and other North American lands, the Treaty "added at one stroke to the 
colonial field of the British Empire an area far greater than that of all its previous American col-
onies together." R. COUPLAND, THE QUEBEC ACT 4 (1925). 
As a practical matter however, "the governance of the country by England really began about 
three years before this date. The capitulation of Quebec City took place on the 18th of 
September, 1759; that of Montreal followed on the 8th of September, 1760." A. HASSARD, CANA· 
DIAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW 23 (1900) [hereinafter cited as HASSARD). Set generally 
A. SHORTT & A. DOUGHTY, DOCUMENTS RELATING TO CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF CANADA, 
1759-1791 (1918) [hereinafter cited as SHORTT & DOUGHTY). See also Articles of Capitulation, 
Quebec, Sept. 18, 1759, reprinted in ! SHORTT & DOUGHTY, supra, at 5; Articles of Capitulation, 
Montreal, Sept. 8, 1760, reprinted in 1 SHORTT & DOUGHTY, supra, at 25. During the years 
1759-1764, Quebec was ruled by a military government. See W. KENNEDY, THE CONSTITUTION 
OF CANADA 25-31 (1922) [hereinafter cited as KENNEDY); Proclamation of Governor Murray, 
Establishing Military Courts, reprinted in 1 SHORTT & DOUGHTY, supra, at H. 
After the Treaty was signed, the British Government moved quickly to solidify its control over 
the territory by granting large tracts of land to British soldiers and citizens. See The Royal Proc-
lamation, Oct. 7, 1763, CAN. REV. STAT. app. at 123, doc. I, para. X (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
Royal Proclamation). Thus, economic domination by the English, one of the focal points of the 
present struggle, was established at an early stage. See notes 12, 18 infra. 
However, because French-Canadians were given eighteen months to leave the country if they 
so desired, id. art. IV, civil government did not commence until August, 1764. See Ordinance of 
Sept. 17, 1764, Establishing Civil Courts, reprinted in 1 SHORTT & DOUGHTY, supra, at 205. 
2. Great Britain previously had formal control over the peninsula of Acadia (Nova Scotia) by 
authority of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between France and Great Britain, Apr. 11, 
1713, Great Britain - France, art. X, 27 Parry's T.S. 477,484. See A. DOUGHTY, THE ACADIAN 
EXILES 17-27 (1918). Acadians were given one year in which to move to another location. Many 
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centered in Quebec,3 have endeavored to erect independent political institu-
tions in order to be free from the de facto domination of English-Canadians 
with whom they have little in common. 4 During the first century following the 
enactment of the Treaty, that struggle was manifested in the provisions of the 
did so, and settled in New England. Sle generally J. HANNAY, HISTORY OF ACADIA (1879); H. 
KIRKE, THE FIRST ENGLISH CoNQUEST OF CANADA (2d ed. 1908). Some of the inhabitants who 
did not leave were forcibly expelled. Sle gennally F. TRACY, TERCENTENARY HISTORY OF CANADA 
383-405 (1908); C. CAMPBELL, A HISTORY OF NOVA ScOTIA 120-31 (1948); E. McINNIS. CANDA: 
A POLITICAL AND SocIAL HISTORY 26-27, 106-14- (1941); F. PARKMAN, A HALF-CENTRURY OF 
CONFLICT 110-212 (1897); G. WOODCOCK, CANADA AND TIlE CANADIANS 75-79 (1970). 
For the history and conduct of British colonial policy in North America and Canada, see A.B. 
KEITH, SELECTED SPEECHES AND DocUMENTS ON BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1763-1917 (1918); 
E. PORRITT, THE FISCAL AND DIPLOMATIC FREEDOM OF THE BRITISH OVERSEAS DoMINIONS 
(1922); D. FARR, THE COWNIAL OFFICE AND CANADA (1955); H.D.HALL, THE BRITISH COM-
MONWEALTH OF NATIONS; A STUDY OF ITS PAST AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT (1920); 1-3 L. 
KNOWLES & C. KNOWLES, THE EcONOMIC DEVEWPMENT OF THE BRITISH OVERSEAS EMPIRE 
(1924-1936); J. HANNAY, How CANADA WAS HELD FOR THE EMPIRE (1905); BUILDERS OF THE 
CANADIAN COMMONWEALTH (G. Locke ed. 1923); Plumptree, The Nature of the Political and 
Economic Development in the British Dominions, 3 CAN. J. EcON. & POL. ScI. 489 (1937); IMPERIAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL DocUMENTS, 1765-1952, A SUPPLEMENT (F. Madden ed. 1953); BRITISH COL-
ONIALISM AND CONFEDERATION (W. Shelton ed. 1967). 
3. The cultural and emotional heart of French-Canada has been centered solely in Quebec 
Province in this century. The Provinces of Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario have had the 
percentage oftheir French-speaking population substantially reduced due to assimilation with the 
English. Sle note 82 infra. Sle also THE TASK FORCE ON CANADIAN UNITY; A FUTURE TOGETHER 
23-25 (1979) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE) for a brief analysis of the French people's 
transformation from Canadians to French-Canadians to Quebeckers, the result of their percep-
tion of a lack of common purpose and 'oneness' with English-speaking Canadians. For thorough 
historical treatments of the French in Canada, see M. WADE, THE FRENCH-CANADIANS 1760-1967 
(1968) [hereinafter cited as WADE); R. RUMILLY, HISTOIRE DE LA PROVINCE DE QUEBEC (1941) 
[hereinafter cited as RUMILLY]. 
4. The differences between French and English Canadians include history, language, law, 
origins, and feelings about Confederation and politics. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 23. As to the 
latter difference, see P. TRUDEAU, FEDERALISM AND THE FRENCH-CANADIANS (1968) [hereinafter 
cited as TRUDEAU], wherein the former Prime Minister of Canada explains that" [h Jistorically, 
French Canadians have not really believed in democracy for themselves; and English Canadians 
have not really wanted it for others. Such are the foundations upon which our two ethnic groups 
have absurdly pretended to be building democratic forms of government." /d. at 103. See also 
Maheux, French Canadians and Democracy, 27 U. TORONTO Q. 341 (1958). 
The sense of being a distinct people is strong among Quebec's inhabitants. For example, a re-
cent poll indicates that 70% of those surveyed regard themselves first as Quibecois or French-
Canadians. Qtubeclcers as Equals, Boston Globe, Oct. 8, 1979, at 68, col. 1 (editorial). Sle note 36 
irifra. 
The major English-French similarity appears to be the fact that "both groups had to contend 
with the rigors of North American existence and undergo the consequences of imperial rule exer-
cised from overseas." G. STANLEY, THE UNEQUAL UNION 6 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 
STANLEY). Sle also W. SANDERS, A ScIENTIFIC APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF FRENCH AND NON-
FRENCH THOUGHT IN CANADA (1943); J. FALARDEAU, ROOTS AND VALUES IN CANADIAN LIVES 
(1961); H. MCCLELLAN, Two SoLITUDES (1945); Bailey, On the Nature of the Distinction &tween the 
French and English in Canada: An Anthropological Inquiry, 28 CAN. HIST. ANN. REV. 63 (1947). 
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Royal Proclamation of 1763,5 the Quebec Act of 1774,6 the Constitutional Act 
5. Royal Proclamation, supra note 1. Aside from the land grant that has been alluded to, the 
Proclamation affirmed that all criminal and civil causes were to be decided according to English 
Laws, id. para. VIII, and mandated the creation of representative assemblies for all its newly ac-
quired territories: Quebec, East and West Florida and Granada. /d. para. I. As for erecting 
democratic institutions in Quebec however, practice diverged from theory. "Although provision 
was made for the calling of a Representative Assembly in the Province, no Assembly ever met. 
The nature ofthe test oath ... , practically operated as an exclusion of all French-Canadians ... , 
Protestants did not number over 300 or 400; the French-Canadian population was about 70,000 
to 80,000." HASSARD, supra note I, at 27. The test oath required that the individual declare his 
loyalty to the King and by implication to the Church of England. As Roman Catholics, they 
would not renounce their faith and pledge allegiance to the Anglican Church, founded as it was 
after King Henry the VIII split with the Church of Rome. 
In addition, due to the fact that a long legal tradition had been developed under a civil code, 
there was confusion as to which law to apply to disputes which arose before and after the issuance 
of the Royal Proclamation. /d. See also KENNEDY, supra note I, at 32-38; D. ALFORD, GENESIS OF 
THE PROCLAMATION OF 1763 (1908); Commission Appointing James Murray, Captain General 
and Governor-in-Chief of the Province of Quebec, Nov. 21, 1763, reprinted in 1 SHORTT & 
DOUGHTY, supra note I, at 173; Instructions to Governor Murray, Dec. 7, 1763, reprinted in 1 
SHORTT & DOUGHTY, supra note I, at 210. 
6. The Quebec Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 83. The Act altered policy on various issues addressed 
by the Royal Proclamation, supra note 1. These issues included the question of religious freedom 
for the French and the resolution of choice-of-Iaw problems. 
As to the former, the document provided that the inhabitants of the" Province of Quebec, may 
have, hold and enjoy, the free exercise of the Religion of the Church of Rome." /d. art. V. 
However, the test oath was retained for representatives. /d. art. VI. See note 5 supra. No restric-
tions were placed upon the practices of the clergy. /d. art. V. See Report of Attorney-General & 
Solicitor-General reo Status of Roman Catholic Subjects, June 10, 1765, reprinted in 1 SHORTT & 
DOUGHTY, supra note I, at 236. The choice-of-Iaw question was complex. Originally, both civil 
and criminal causes were to be settled as nearly as possible with the Laws of England. See note 5 
supra. However, it was found that so deciding in civil matters visited hardship upon the French 
inhabitants. Thus, that part of the Royal Proclamation, supra note I, which required the applica-
tion of the common law of England on questions of property, civil rights and so forth was declared 
to be null and void. The Quebec Act. 1774, 14 Geo. 3, C. 83. Citizens of the Province could seek 
redress of their grievances under the Laws of Canada. /d. art. VIII. However, the Laws of 
England were retained for criminal cases. /d. art. XI. See J. BOURINOT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF CANADA 12-16 (1888) [hereinafter cited as BOURINOTj; HASSARD, supra note I, at 
28-33; L. BAUDOUIN, LE DROIT CIVIL DE LA PROVINCE DE QUEBEC: MODELE VIVANT DE DROIT 
COMPARE (1953). 
This meant that the Coutume de Paris, as modified during the period of its application to 
New France, was to govern, not only land tenure, but also marriage, inheritance, and 
trade and commerce ... , [t]he French Civil Law was not to apply to lands granted in 
common soccage, nor to prevent the execution of wills according to English law. 
G. STANLEY, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION, 31-32 (1969) [hereinafter 
cited as STANLEY, HISTORY). See Plan of a Code of Laws for the Province of Quebec, 1774, 
reprinted in 1 SHORTT & DOUGHTY, supra note I, at 440. For sources on the development of the 
Coutume de Paris, see KENNEDY, supra, note I, at 54 n. 3. Though a distinction was set-up between 
English criminal and French civil law, in practice there was much overlap. See generally H. M. 
NEATBY, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER THE QUEBEC ACT (1937). Strong evidence 
suggests that the Quebec Act was prompted by British concern over the American Revolution. 
See KENNEDY, supra note I, at 50-70; J. SMITH, OUR STRUGGLE FOR THE FOURTEENTH COLONY: 
CANADA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1908). 
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of 1791,7 the Act of Union of 18408 and the British North America Act of 1867 
(BNA Act). 9 Subsequent to the passage of the latter act, which established the 
7. The Constitutional Act, 1791,31 Geo. 3, c. 31. This document served two main purposes. 
First, it allowed for the Province of Quebec to be separated into Upper and Lower Canada, id. 
art. II, "ostensibly to give limited recognition to the French-Canadian identity in the area." 
STANLEY, supra note 4, at 141. See also Order-in -Council Dividing the Province of Quebec into 
Upper and Lower Canada, reprinted in 1 A. DOUGHTY & D. MAcARTHUR, DOCUMENTS 
RELATING TO CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF CANADA, 1791-1818, at 3 (1914). Second, as a 
serious attempt at representative government, the document set out a plan for the establishment 
and conduct of a legislature and assembly in both provinces. The Constitutional Act, 1791,31 
Geo. 3, c. 31, arts. II-XXXII. 
In general, the plan did not allow the French a greater political voice. TRUDEAU, supra note 4, 
at 116. See also Brun, La Constitution d.1791, 10 Recherches Sociographiques 37 (1969); GOUVERNE-
MENT DE QUEBEC, QUEBEC-CANADA: A NEW DEAL 5 (1979) [hereinafer cited as NEW DEALI. The 
latter book, issued in November, 1979, contains the Quebec Government's proposal for 
sovereignty-association as well as historical and economic evidence in .support of a call for in-
dependent status. See note 18 infra. 
The impetus for The Constitutional Act, 1791, 31 Geo. 3, c. 31, grew out of an English migra-
tion towards the upper part of Canada. This migration was stimulated by the Definitive Treaty of 
Peace between His Brittanic Majesty and the United States of America, Sept. 3, 1783, Great 
Britain-United States, 48 Parry's T.S. 487. One section of the Treaty, titled "Additional In-
structions to Haldimand," provided that any British subject, now living in the United States of 
America, could migrate to Canada and claim a certain amount of acreage based on their military 
rank or civilian status. /d. paras. 1-6. See Royal Proclamation, supra note 1, for a similar provi-
sion. Many English took up the offer and the concentration oftheir population prompted them to 
seek their own legislative representatives and system of laws to confirm their land interests. 
STANLEY, HISTORY, supra riote 6, at 36-37; KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 74-76. 
8. Act of Union, 1840, 3 & 4 Vict., c. 35. The Act repealed The Constitutional Act, 1791, 31 
Geo. 3, c. 31, and re-united the two Canadas. Act of Union, 1840,3 & 4 Vict., c. 35, arts. I-II. 
This was done primarily to facilitate the assimilation of the French and to guarantee legislative 
supremacy for the English minority. See STANLEY, UNION,supra note 4, at 138-52; TRUDEAU, supra 
note 4, at 117. A series of riots, which occurred in Lower Canada (Quebec) in the late 1830' s, and 
the belief of English-Canadians that the French were over-represented in the Legislature, 
precipitated the Act. See HASSARD, supra note 1, at 53-64; NEW DEAL, supra note 4, at 5. For two 
excellent period pieces, see LORD DURHAM, REPORT ON THE AFFAIRS OF BRITISH NORTH 
AMERICA (Sir Charles Lucas ed. 1912), a report commissioned in 1840 after the uprisings re-
ferred to above, discussed at KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 167-81; Sir Francis Bond Head, ADDRESS 
AGAINST THE BILL FOR THE UNION OF THE CANADAS (Pamphlet 1840). Even though they were re-
united, their equality was affirmed, Act of Union, 1840, 3 & 4 Vict., c. 35, art. XII, and their 
separate laws and courts were maintained. /d. arts. XLVI, XLCII. 
The history of the Province of Lower Canada is a rich one, and the period is notable for the in-
sight it provides on the nature and development of a distinct French-Canapian society in North 
America. See generally 1-6 R. CHRISTIE, HISTORY OF THE LATE PROVINCE OF LOWER CANADA, 
1791-1841, (1848-55); J. MONET, THE LAST CANNON SHOT: A STUDY OF FRENCH-CANADIAN NA-
TIONALISM, 1837-1850 (1969); H. MANNING, THE REVOLT OF FRENCH CANADA, 1800-1835: A 
CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH (1962); CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
NATIONALISM IN LOWER CANADA (R. Cook ed. 1969); D. VAUGEOIS, L'UNION DES DEUX 
CANADAS, 1791-1840 (1962); F. OUELLET, LE BAS-CANADA, 1791-1840 (1976). 
9. British North America Act [BNA Act], 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. The BNA Act forms part 
of the fundamental constitutional law of Canada, see note 21 infra, and formally established the 
Confederation of Canada. [d. art. 1(3). At that time, Canada was organized into the provinces of 
Quebec, Ontario, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The "Canadas" were again split in two, 
with Lower Canada constituting the Province of Quebec and Upper Canada the Province of On-
tario. /d. art. 1(6). 
Many of the documents of the organizing conference (convened in 1864) were lost and remain-
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Canadian Confederation, a slow and uneven evolutionary process,IO fueled by 
issues oflanguage rights, II unequal treatment,12 religion and nationalism has 
ed missing until they were uncovered some years later quite by accident. See J. POPE, CONFEDERA· 
TlON: BEING A SERIES OF HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED DocUMENTS BEARING ON THE BRITISH NORTH 
AMERICA ACT (1893). See generally D. CREIGHTON, THE ROAD TO CONFEDERATION, THE 
EMERGENCE OF CANADA: 1863-1867 (1964); W. MORTON, THE CRITICAL YEARS: THE UNION OF 
BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1857-1873 (1964); Beauschesne, Events which Led to Confederation, 10 
CAN. BAR REV. 101 (1932); L.A, GROULX, LA CONFEDERATION CANADIENNE, SES ORIGINES 
(1918); Doughty, Notts on the Quebec Conference, 1864, 1 CAN. HIST. REV. 26 (1920); 1 RUMILLY, 
supra note 3, at 9-94. 
10. Separatist or pro-independence elements have always been present in Quebec, a natural 
reaction perhaps for a conquered people. In fact, in 1865, only twenty-six of the forty-eight 
deputies from Quebec to the founding conference voted in favor of the Union. J. BROSSARD, 
L'AcCESSION A LA SOUVERAINETE: LE CAS DE QUEBEC 212 (1976) [hereinafter cited as BROSSARD) 
(author's translation). The significance of this fact is discussed in note 193 infra. 
Resistance to British domination has not always been consistently forceful, but rather has been 
motivated by a response to specific issues. 
It is important to underline that the idea of independence is far from being a new one in 
Quebec: on the contrary, the independence movement has been present for nearly two 
centuries and constitutes one of the permanent themes of its history ... it has witnessed 
many revivals of its vigor and continuity; this was particularly the case at the beginning 
of the 19th century and the 1830's, at the end of the 19th century after Quebec entered 
the Canadian federation on the occasion of the First World War and the conscription 
crisis of 1917; during the economic crisis of the 1930's and on the occurrence of the sec-
ond conscription crisis; and finally - for the first time in a positive and not solely defen-
sive fashion - since 1960 and since the creation of the first independence parties. 
!d. at 194-95 (author's translation). 
The conscription crises merit further discussion. In both World Wars, the majority of English-
Canadians believed they should assist Britain in the war effort. However, French-Canadians 
were not enthusiastic about the idea of rallying to defend the mother country. See J. LAXER & R. 
LAXER, THE LIBERAL IDEA OF CANADA 163 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LAXER & LAXER). The 
result in both crises was that, despite the clear opposition of Quebec's elected officials, mandatory 
conscription was ordered. See note 13 infra. See also Robin, Registration, Conscription and 1ndepmdmt 
Labour Politics, 1916-1917,47 CAN. HIST. REV. 101 (1966); NEW DEAL. supra note 7, at 11. 
11. For a survey of the genesis of language rights in Canada and Quebec, ste COMMISSION OF 
INQUIRY, THE POSITION OF THE FRENCH LANGUAGE AND OF FRENCH LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN 
QUEBEC: REPORT (Editeur officiel de Quebec 1972); 1-4 ROYAL COMMISSION OF BI· 
CULTURALISM AND BI·LINGUALISM (Government of Canada 1969) [hereinafter cited as BI·BI 
REPORT); 1-10 C. SHEPPARD, INVENTAIRE CRITIQUES DES DROITS LINGUISTIQUES AU QUEBEC 
(Editeur officiel de Quebec 1972-74). See also note 82 infra. 
12. Not to be discounted in the present crisis is the impact of the French-Quebeckers belief 
that they have been treated as second-class citizens. See MacNeil-Lehrer Report, The Rene 
Levesque Interview, Transcript 64149 at 3 Gan. 25, 1979) (copy available from WNET Channel 
13, New York, N.Y.) [hereinafter cited as Levesque Interview). 
The economic standing of French-Quebeckers provides some support for a charge of second-
class citizenship. For example, in Quebec, three times as many English speakers earn more than 
$10,000 per year than French speakers earning at that level. However, the English constitute less 
than 20% of the Province's population. See Astrachan, An Obsession with Unity, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Aug. 20, 1977, at 14. "The standard of living in Quebec is 7% less than that of 
Canada as a whole and 20% less than the rest of Ontario (1973 base)." BROSSARD. supra note 10, 
at 228. Moreover, out of fourteen ethnic groups in the Province, the French rank twelfth in 
labour income, nearly 9% lower than the provincial mean. 3 BI·BI REPORT. supra note II, at 23. 
Recently, there have been indications that the imbalance is being redressed somewhat. See TASK 
FORCE, supra note 3, at 74-75. See also R. LoVE, REPARTITION ET INEGALITE DES REVENUS AU 
CANADA Tableau 3.1 (1979), where it is noted that the average family income for Quebec ranks 
behind only two of the other nine provinces, though an ethnic breakdown is not provided. 
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taken root in Quebec under the rubric of a call for separate rule for the Prov-
ince. This desire was most significantly expressed in the provincial election of 
November 1976, in which the Parti Quebecois (P.Q.), headed by the party's 
founder, M. Rene Levesque, was elected to a majority position in the provin-
cial assembly. 13 
The new government ascended to power primarily on the issue of strong 
and effective rule,a but in the background was the P. Q.'s decade-long call for 
an independent Quebec. As a result "[F]or the first time since it was created 
in 1867, the Canadian political union faced the genuine possibility of the 
secession of one of its largest provinces." 15 That possibility is no less real to-
13. The party, originally called Le Mouvement Souveraineti-Association, was begun by Rene 
Levesque in 1966 after he broke from the Liberal Party because of its electoral loss in that year. 
The P. Q. is not the first to espouse a separatist solution, though it is by far the strongest and 
most well-organized group. During WW II, an anti-compulsory service party won 15% of the 
vote. See P. DESBERATS. RENE: A CANADIAN IN SEARCH OF A COUNTRY 142 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as DESBERATS). In 1957, l'Alliance Laurentimne was formed with Raymond Barbeau, a 
strongly pro-separatist figure, as president. In 1960, Marcel Chaput founded Le Rassemblement 
pour l'Indipendence Nationale (RIN), dedicated .to a sovereign Quebec. See M. CHAPUT. POURQUOI 
JE SUIS StPARATISTE (1961). In 1966, the RIN received less than 9% of the popular vote in the 
provincial elections. See D. CAMERON. NATIONALISM. SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE QUEBEC 
QUESTION 134 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CAMERON). Other parties that espoused an in-
dependence/separatist doctrine included l'Action Socialiste pour l'Indipendtmce du Q}ibec, Le Parti 
Ripublicain de Quebec and Le Front Ripublicain pour l'Indipenderu:e. For a discussion of these groups, 
see id. at 135-36. 
None of these parties showed tendencies as radical as those displayed by Le Front pour La Libira-
tion de Quibec (FLQ). The rash of terrorist bombings carried out by members of the FLQ were in 
sharp contrast to the 'Quiet Revolution' (signifying an increased desire on the part of Quebeckers 
to play a m~or role in the decision-making process) begun with the provincial election of Premier 
Lesage and his Liberal Party in 1960. See L. DION, QUEBEC: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 
(1976). In October, 1970, British Trade Commissioner James R. Cross and Quebec Labour 
Minister Pierre LaPorte were kidnapped by FLQmembers. LaPorte was later found dead. SeeJ. 
SAYWELL, QUEBEC 70 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SAYWELL); M. LEVIN & C. SYLVESTER, CRISIS 
IN QUEBEC (1973); G. PELLETIER, LA CRISE D'OcTOBRE (1971). For a radical interpretation ofthe 
history of the French-Canadians in Quebec, see P. VALLIERES, WHITE NIGGERS OF AMERICA 
(1971). 
14. "In the 1976 election campaign the party played down the independence issue and em-
phasized specific social and economic reforms along with effective leadership." Smiley, The GaM-
dian FederaJion and the challenge of Quebec Independence, 8 PUBLIUS 203 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Smiley). See also Mans, Ganado. 's Gonstitulional Grisis: Separatism and Subversion, 98 Conflict Studies 
1, 6 (1978). 
15. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 11. This statement is somewhat misleading because Nova 
Scotia has threatened to secede twice since 1867. The first instance occurred in 1868 and stem-
med from the alleged lack of consent by the people and the legislature to the Union. See P. GERIN-
LAJOIE, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN CANADA 139 (1950) [herinafter cited as 
GtRIN-LAJOIE). The Provincial Assembly appealed to the Queen, through the channels of the 
Lieutenant-Governor and the Governor-General, alleging that a fraud had been visited upon the 
Queen. See 9 DoMINION OF CANADA, SESSIONAL PAPERS No. 66, 31 Vict. (1867-68). The petition 
was refused and Nova Scotia was told to look to Ottawa' 'to relax or modify any arrangements in 
those subjects which may prejudice the peculiar interests of Nova Scotia." Maxwell, Petitions to 
London by Provincial Governments, 14 CAN. BAR REV. 738,739 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Maxwell). 
Finally, in 1886, Nova Scotia vented its economic dissatisfaction with Confederation through 
the election of a government which advocated secession. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 65. 
That the secessionist threat is' perceived as real by the Canadian people is not questioned. See 
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day. A referendum question, asking Quebeckersl6 if they wish the provincial 
government to proceed with negotiations to form a politically independent 
Quebec,11 which would be linked economically with the rest of Canada, 18 will 
generally MUST CANADA FAIL? (R. Simeon ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as MUST CANADA FAIL]. See 
also Fletcher, Public Attitudes and Alternative Futures, in MUST CANADA FAIL. supra, at 29. This 
perception is not a new one. In 1968, then/Prime Minister of Canada Lester Pearson offered that 
"dissatisfaction is a fact and ... , if it is\allowed to continue without remedy, it could lead to 
separation and the end of Confederation. [WJhat is at stake in my opinion is no less than 
Canada's survival as a nation." 1 GOVERNMENT OF CANADA. THE DoMINION/PROVINCIAL CON· 
STITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. 1968-1969, at 10 (1969) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE 
1968-1969]. 
16. There is dispute as to which bloc of voters is the appropriate one to cast ballots on an in-
dependence referendum question; is it to be by all voters in Quebec Province or only French-
speakers to the exclusion of the English? For the recommendation that it be by all voters in the 
Province, see BROSSARD. supra note 10, at 183-85; TASK FORCE. supra note 3, at 114. 
17. Former Prime Minister Trudeau has maintained consistently that the issue of a politically 
independent Quebec is not a negotiable one. Giniger, Trudeau Says Re-Election Aim is Unity of 
Canada, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1979, S A, at 9, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Giniger]. Some com-
mentators believe this strategy could backfire and lead Quebeckers to declare unilaterally their 
independence rather than negotiate it. Milner, Quebec Sovereignty and the Canadian Interest, CANA-
DIAN FORUM. May 1978, at 14. But see note 46 infra. 
18. The concept of sovereignty-association was first proposed by Rene Levesque in 1964 . For 
a summary of its principles, see R. Levesque, AN OPTION FOR QUEBEC 35-46, 94-108 (1968) 
[hereinafter cited as OPTION FOR QUEBEC]; NEW DEAL. supra note 7, at 48-65. Ostensibly, the P. 
Q. desires political sovereignty for Quebec with an economic association with the rest of Canada. 
Examples of economic association models include the European Economic Community and the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations, among others. /d. at 48-49. 
Under the Quebec Government proposal, Quebec would be sovereign, and have its own inter-
national personality. /d. at 54. Federal laws now in effect that apply to the Province will remain 
so unless repealed or replaced by the Quebec National Assembly. /d. at 55. Canadians would be 
accorded the same rights in Quebec, as Quebeckers would enjoy in the rest of Canada. /d. at 56. 
Quebec will remain bound by treaties Canada has signed unless the need for withdrawal arises, 
id., and the Province will seek membership in the United Nations. /d. at 57. 
Economic association will vary according to the degree of integration desired. The Quebec 
Government wishes to negotiate a treaty of association. /d. At this point in time, the Province 
proposes that goods circulate freely and that a single common tariff be agreed upon. ld. at 58. A 
common currency would be maintained. /d. 
In order to administer the association, the Quebec Government suggests that four Quebec-
Canada agencies be established: a community council, a commission of experts, a court of 
justice, and a monetary authority. The first agency would decide questions of common concern 
and the second agency would serve as liaison with the international community. The court of 
justice would be empowered to interpret the treaty of association. Finally, the monetary authority 
would be responsible for running a central bank. /d. at 61-64. A community parliament is viewed 
favorably. Id. at 64. 
The Government's plan has been rejected by five provincial premiers and the present head of 
the central government. See Giniger, Clark Rqects Proposal for Separate Quebec, Rules Out Negotiation, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1979, at 5, col. 4; Levesque Faces Opposition, Boston Globe, Nov. 8, 1979, at 
17, col. 2. 
The preservation of a tariff in any economic association is important to Quebec, as her in-
dustries are of the type that require heavy financial support. See The Cost of being Quebecois, THE 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 1979, at 91-92 [hereinafter cited as THE ECONOMIST]. Others, however, 
find that the present tariff structure disfavors Quebec because it narrows the available export 
market. See R. TREMBLAY. INDEPENDANCE ET MARCHE COMMUN QUEBEC ET ETATS-UNIS 46-64 
(1970). See also H. MILNER, THE DECOLONIZATION OF QUEBEC 32-40 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 
MILNER]. 
In any case, the major benefits of tariff protection flow to Quebec and Ontario, and some have 
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most likely be placed before the voters prior to June 1980. 19 This relationship 
has been labelled a sovereignty-association. 
This Comment will examine the legitimacy of Quebec's claim to political 
sovereignty. It will include a discussion of particular aspects of Canadian con-
stitutionallaw, the principle of self-determination as developed by the United 
Nations and several doctrines of customary international law which bear on 
the topic. What will emerge is an understanding of where the sources of 
decision-making power lie as Canada and Quebec attempt to resolve their 
crisis of confederation. 20 
suggested that Ontario would be unable to maintain the present tariff structure in the face of op-
position from other provinces. THE ECONOMIST, supra, at 92-94. However, various studies seem 
to bear out the Quebec Government's claim that the rest of Canada would suffer economic hard-
ship if the other provinces refused to negotiate an economic association. See NEW DEAL, supra note 
7, at 73-75. Others have suggested that both the English and French would lose in a tariff war as 
an independent Quebec Government could utilize a full-range of protective devices which would 
dry up the Quebec market for goods manufactured in other parts of Can ada. Pentland, Association 
after Sovereignty, in MUST CANADA FAIL, supra note 15, at 232. Curiously, it is alleged that the 
pressures of harmonization, integration and redistribution, which would necessarily flow from 
any trading agreements, would place greater restraints on Quebec's freedom of action, making it 
more economically dependent after independence. /d. at 241-42. See also notes 74-75 irifra. 
19. NEW DEAL, supra note 7, at 69-82. As now proposed, there will be two referendums. The 
first will seek the voters approval to negotiate with Canada on the basis of equality of nations, the 
second, a later referendum, will have voters express their opinion on a change in Quebec's 
political status. See Ernhofer, CanadtJ's Language Decision and lhe Quebec Referendum, Boston Globe, 
Dec. 24, 1979, at 6, col. 4. The text of the first question was recently released. It reads: 
The Government of Quebec has made public its proposal to negotiate a new agree-
ment with the rest of Canada based on the equality of nations: 
This agreement would enable Quebec to acquire the exclusive power to make its 
laws, administer its taxes and establish relations abroad-in other words, sovereignty-
and at the same time to maintain with Canada an economic association including a 
common currency; 
Any cha~ge in political status resulting from these negotiations will be submitted to 
the people through a referendum; 
On these terms, do you agree to give the Government of Quebec the mandate to 
negotiate the proposed agreement between Quebec and Canada? 
Best, Referendum Questionfor Quebec is Denounced as 'Fraud', London Times, Dec. 22, 1979, at 5, col. 
2. 
20. Many different theories as to the nature of the Canadian Confederation have been in 
vogue at various times: the centralist concept (1867-1960), administrative federalism 
(1920-present), the co-ordinate concept (1880-1940, 1960 to present), the compact theory 
(1880-1940) and the dualist concept (1950-1970). For a survey discussion of these concepts, see E. 
BLACK, DIVIDED LOYALTIES: CANADIAN CONCEPTS OF FEDERALISM 21-202 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as BLACK). Of the five, the compact theory was especially important to French-Canadians, 
who advanced the position that since the BNA Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, was a compact 
(contract), it required the unanimous consent of the provinces and/or the traditional historical 
communities of Canada before it could be amended. See GERIN·LAJOIE, supra note 15, at 39-40. 
LAXER & LAXER,supra note 10, at 161. Valuable as a political rallying point for a period, the com-
pact theory has been severely discredited. See Rodgers, The Compact Theory ofConfetkration, 9 CAN. 
BAR REV. 395 (1931). One author has recently tried to resurrect the theory. STANLEY, HISTORY, 
supra note 6, at 94-98. On the history and political significance of the compact theory, see Fit-
zgerald, The Compact Theory and the Consent of the Province to Amendments, 13 REVUE DE L'UNIVER8ITE 
d'ONTARIO(1943); Mallory, The Compact Theory ofConfetkration, 21 DALHOUSIE REV. 342 (1941); 
D. CREIGTON, THE ROAD TO CONFEDERATION (1964). 
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The author contends that under Canadian constitutional law, the separa-
tion of Quebec can be effected, though it is unlikely that the broad measure of 
trans-Canadian support necessary for the procedures involved will be 
forthcoming. An analysis of United Nations' pronouncements reveals a 
limited right allowing secesssion. As a practical matter, however, this right can 
be only exercised if the Province can foster the belief among memb~rs' of the 
international community that French-Quebeckers require sovereign rule in 
order to survive as a distinct people. Whether'Quebec can marshall such sup-
port presents a question which is more political than legal in nature. 
II. CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A. Components of Fundamental Law 
The body of Canadian constitutional law is based primarily on the British 
North America Act of 1867 and subsequent amendments. 21 The BNA Act is 
21. Se. British North America Act [BNA Act), 1871, 34 & 35 Vic!., c. 28; Parliament of 
Canada Act, 1875,38 & 39 Vic!., c. 38; British North America Act [BNA Act), 1886,49 & 50 
Vic!., c. 35; British North America Act [BNA Act), 1915, 5 & 6 Ceo. 5, c. 45; British North 
America Act [BNA Act), 1916,6 & 7 Ceo. 5, c. 19; British North America Act[BNA Act), 1930, 
20 & 21 Ceo. 5, c. 26; British North America Act [BNA Act), 1940,3 & 4 Ceo. 6, c. 36, British 
North America Act [BNA Act), 1943, 6 & 7 Ceo. 6, c. 30; British North America [BNA Act), 
1946,9& 10 Ceo. 6, c. 63; British North America Act [BNA Act), 1949, 12 & 13 Ceo. 6 c. 22; 
British North America Act [BNA Act) (No.2), 1949,13 Ceo. 6, c. 81; British North America Act 
[BNA Act), 1951,14 & 15 Ceo. 6, c. 32; British North America Act [BNA Act), 1952, 1 Eliz. 2, 
c. 15 (Can.); British North America Act [BNA Act), 1960,9 Eliz. 2, c. 2; British North America 
Act [BNA Act), 1964, 12 & 13 Eliz. c. 73; British North America Act [BNA Act), 1965, 14 Eliz. 
2, c. 4 (Can.). 
BROSSARD, supra note 10, provides a summary of these amendments: 
Between 1867-1967, the Canadian Constitution was amended 15 times: twice solely by 
direct order of the federal government in 1871 and 1875, and thirteen times since then 
by way of joint address of the Senate and the House of Commons. Seven of the amend-
ments thus obtained involved only federal institutions, the other eight applied more or 
less directly to the provinces, as they operated on the division of powers (three times), 
federal subsidies (one time), national resources (one time), the creation of new pro-
vinces (two times) and judges of the superior courts in the provinces (one time). 
/d. at 259 (author's translation). 
In addition to the above amendments, CERIN·LAJOIE, supra note 15, lists three other amend-
ments to the BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vic!., c. 3; Canada (Ontario Boundary) Act, 1889,52 & 53 
Vict., c. 28; Canadian Speaker (Appointment of Deputy) Act, 1895, 59 Vic!., c. 3; BNA Act, 
1907,7 Edw. 7, c. 11. But see K. C. WHEARE,THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER AND DOMINION 
STATUS 188 (1938) [hereinafter cited as WHEARE, STATUTE), where he specifically excludes the 
Parliament of Canada Act, 1875, and the BNA Act, 1907. The discrepancy arises over differing 
interpretations placed on the operative language of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Ceo. 5, 
c. 4. Se. note 29 infra. See generally 1-2 COVERNMENT OF ONTARIO, ONTARIO ADVISORY COMMIT. 
TEE ON CONFEDERATION (1967-68) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMITTEE]. See also Leder-
man, The Process of Constitutional Amendment in Canada, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra, at 77. 
Though the Canada (Ontario Boundary) Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vic!., c. 28, and the Canadian 
Speaker (Appointment of Deputy) Act, 1895, 59 Vict., c. 3, are technically amendents to the 
BNA Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vic!., c. 3, they represented matters of routine statute revision and had 
little lasting importance. B. LASKIN, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 32 (3d ed. 1966) 
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the world's eighth oldest written constitutional document and the third oldest 
of a federal nature. 22 However, it would be an error to consider the document 
as 'the Constitution,' comprising the sum and substance of Canadian con-
stitutional law. Paul Gerin-Lajoie, one of Canada's foremost constitutional 
experts, notes: 
In Canada, some writers refer to the British North America Act, 
1867, as amended from time to time, as being "the Constitution" 
(sometimes written with a small "c"). Others insist on referring to 
it only as "the written part of the constitution." The lack of 
uniformity is easily explained. Most students of constitutional law 
in Canada were instructed first in English constitutional law and 
many of them have thus been accustomed to use the word "con-
stitution" in its broad meaning as it is used in Great Britain. Fur-
thermore, Canada does not possess any constitutional document 
called "the Constitution" or "the Constitutional Act. "23 
In addition to the amended BNA Act, the 'Constitution' includes British 
and Canadian acts of Parliament, 24 British orders-in-council,25 conventions of 
[hereinafter cited as LASKIN); Scott, Forgotten Ammdmmts to the Canadian Constitution, 20 CAN. BAR 
REV. 339 (1942). 
22. The United States' federal constitution was adopted in 1787, that of Switzerland in 1848, 
making the Dominion of Canada the third oldest federal system. CAMERON, supra note 13, at 108. 
Cf K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 23 (1946) [hereinafter cited as WHEARE,FEDERAL), 
where he suggests that the Argentine Constitution of 1853 is a federal constitution. See also G. 
CODDING, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SwrrzERLAND(I961). 
For studies on the history and workings of the constitutional law in Canada, see B. BISSONETTE, 
ESSAI SUR LA CONSTITUTION DU CANADA (1963); R. AREs, OPTIONS POUR UNE NOUVELLE CON· 
STITUTION (1967); R. HOPKINS, CONFEDERATION AT THE CROSSROADS: THE CANADIAN CON· 
STITUTION (1967); P. G ERIN· LAJOIE, RtFLEXlONS SUR LA CONSTITUTION CANADIENNE (1952); N. 
DORION, LA CONSTITUTION CANADIENNE (1955); K.C. WHEARE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUC· 
TURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH (1960) [hereinafter cited as WHEARE); Rand, Some Aspects of Cana-
dian Constitutionalism, 38 CAN. BAR REV. 135 (1960); Johnson, The Dynamics of Federalism in Canada, 
1 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 18 (1968); Jennings, Constitutional Interpretation - The Experience of Canada, 51 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1937); FEDERALISM IN THE COMMONWEALTH (W. 'Livingston ed. 1963); P. 
HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA (1977). 
23. GERIN·LAJOIE, supra note 15, at 5. 
24. Most important among the session laws passed by the Canadian Parliament have been 
those creating and admitting additional provinces. See The Manitoba Act of 1870, 33 Vict., c. 3 
(Can.); The Alberta Act of 1905,4 & 5 Edw. 7, c. 3 (Can.); The Saskatchewan Act of 1905,4 & 5 
Edw. 7, c. 42 (Can.). 
In 1912, part ofthe North-western Territories were added to existing provinces by the Ontario 
Boundaries Extension Act, 1912,2 Geo. 5, c. 40 (Can.), the Quebec Boundaries Extension Act, 
1912,2 Geo. 5, c. 45 (Can.), and the Manitoba Boundaries Extension Act, 1912,2 Geo. 5, c. 32 
(Can.). Manitoba received additional territory under the Manitoba Boundaries Extension Act, 
1930,20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 28 (Can.). The North-western Territory was also divided by the Yukon 
Territory Act, 1898,61 Vict., c. 6 (Can.), as amended by the Yukon Territory Act, 1899,62 & 
63 Vict., c. 11 (Can.). 
The British Parliament, under Rupert's Land Act, 1868,31 & 32 Vict., c. 105, provided that 
the territories covered under the Act could be considered for admission into the Dominion of 
Canada. See note 25 infra. The BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, which made the four prov-
inces part of the Union, was enacted by the British Parliament. See note 9 supra. The BNA Act, 
1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 22, which admitted Newfoundland as a province in the Union, was 
enacted by the British Parliament. 
25. The most important orders-in-council have also concerned the admission oflands into the 
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procedure imported from Britain or developed at home26 and judicial deci-
sionsY Additionally, two pieces of British colonial legislation, the Colonial 
Laws Validity Act, 1865,28 and the Statute of Westminster, 1931,29 are rele-
Union. See Order of Her Majesty In Council Admitting Rupert's Land and the North-western 
Territory Into the Union, Court of Windsor, June 23rd, 1870, in CAN. REV. STAT. app., at 257, 
doc. 9 (1970); Order of Her Majesty In Council Admitting British Columbia Into the Union, 
Court of Windsor, May 16th, 1871, in CAN. REV. STAT. app., at 279, doc. 10 (1970); Order of 
Her Majesty In Council Admitting Prince Edward Island Into the Union, Court of Windsor, 
June 26th, 1873, in CAN. REV. STAT. app., at 291, doc. 12 (1970). 
26. See notes 63, 65-66 infra. 
27. See generally J. BROSSARD, LA COUR SUPREME ET LA CONSTITUTION LE FORUM CONSTlTU· 
TIONNEL AU CANADA (1968); MacDonald, judicial Interpretation of the Canadian Constitution,. 1 U. 
TORONTO L. J. 260 (1936); Clokie, judicial Review, Federalism and the Canadian Constitution, 8 CAN. 
J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 537 (1942); STANLEY, HISTORY, supra note 6, at 111-43. 
28. The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63. The Act was designed to 
remove doubts as to the validity of laws passed by the legislatures of the colonies. It declared that 
any colonial law which was repugnant to an English Law extending to the colonies was null and 
void. /d. S II. However, mere repugnancy to any law of England would not render the law in-
operative unless the English law was intended to have an effect in the colonies. /d. § III. 
Before it could be claimed therefore, that a colonial law was void on the grounds of 
repugnancy to a British act, it must by shown that the British act did really extend to 
the colony, and in order to show this it must be possible to demonstrate that the' express 
words' or the 'necessary intendment' of the act required this interpretation. 
WHEARE, FEDERAL, supra note 22, at 22. 
The reach of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865,28 & 29 Vict., c. 63, has been restricted in 
this century. See note 29 infra. See also note 35 irifra. 
29. The Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4. The Statute repealed the Colonial 
Laws Validity Act, 1865,28 & 29 Vict., c. 63, insofar as it applied to Canada (subject to excep-
tions), Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland. The laller 
did not become a member of Canada until 1949. See note 24 supra. These members of the Com-
monwealth could now pass legislation repugnant to the Laws of England and could amend any 
existing or future law of the Parliament of the United Kingdom which applied or would apply to 
them. Statute of Westminster, 1931,22 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 2(2). In addition, acts of the Parliaments 
of the Dominions would now have extra-territorial effect. /d. S 3. Finally, the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom could not pass a law, intended to extend to any Dominion, "unless it is express-
ly declared in that Act that the Dominion has requested, and consented to, enactment thereof.·· 
ld. S 4. 
Several members of the Commonwealth did not find the safeguard in Section 4 adequate. and 
did not sign the Statute of Westminster. For example, India required that any act of the Parlia-
ment of the United Kingdom which was to extend to India be specifically approved by an act of 
its own legislature after the British act was enacted by the British Parliament. Sf( The indian in-
dependence Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 30, S 6(4). The same solution was followed b,· the 
Union of South Africa through the Status of the Union Act, 1934, No. 69, § 2. (S .. -\ti·il"a). For a 
discussion of these two countries, see WHEARE, FEDERAL, supra note 22, at 30-35. 
In 1931, Canada had not yet settled on a proper means through which constitutional amend-
ment could be effected, and they have still not done so today. See text accompanying- note 50 i~fra. 
Thus, as a means for protecting certain laws as 'fundamental', an exception to the repeal of the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63, was written into the Statute of 
Westminster. The Validity Act was held to still be in force with respect to the BNA Acts of 
1867-1930 and to any rule or regulation made thereunder. Statute ofWestminstt'r. 1931,22 Geo. 
5, c. 4, § 7(1).The import of this provision was to preserve a set of donllllents and place their 
alteration, 
beyond the ordinary competence of any legislative body in Canada ... [t]he com-
petence of the several legislative bodies in Canada is not only t'xdusiw of the power of 
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vant to the question of whether the Parliaments of the respective Member-
Countries of the British Commomwealth may pass legislation unencumbered 
by restrictions placed upon those bodies by the British Parliament. Finally, 
various imperial decrees and other acts and declarations including the Im-
perial Conference Decree of 1926,30 the Seals Act of 1939,31 and the Letters 
Patent of 1947,32 have defined Canada's legal status in the area of foreign rela-
tions with Great Britain and the international community. 
formal repeal, amendment, or alteration of certain acts or orders, but exclusive of the 
power to pass any law or any provision of law incompatible with any of them. 
GERIN.LAJOIE, supra note 15, at 6, 8. The difficulty this provision creates for efforts aimed at 
amending the Constitution will be discussed in Section II (2) infra. 
Through the Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 7(2), Canadian federal and pro-
vinciallegislation was exempted from the operation of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865,28 
& 29 Vict., c. 63, subject, of course, to the request or the consent by the federal legislature pro-
vided for in Section 4 of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 4. "That is to say, 
British acts ceased to be fundamental law in Canada." GERIN-LAJOIE, supra note 15, at 7. 
It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865,28 & 29 
Vict., c. 63 (with respect to the BNA Acts of 1867-1930 or any rule stemming therefrom) and the 
Statute of Westminster, 1931,22 Geo. 5, c. 4 (with respect to any subsequent BNA Act or act of 
the federal provincial legislatures) are documents of prime importance to Canada's constitutional 
scheme. One must not fail to observe especially, the test for 'protected documents' provided 
under the Statute of Westminster, 1931,22 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 7(1). 
It is also submitted that the Constitution contains an unwritten component including" all the 
great landmarks in British history insofar as they are working principles - the Magna Carta, the 
Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights, the Habeus Corpus Acts [and) the Act of Settlement ... " 
KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 378. 
As one might expect, legal literature on the two acts is thorough. See generally, Kennedy, Some 
Recent Aspects of Imperial Constitutional Law, 12 CAN. HIST. REV. 295 (1931); Ewart, The Statute of 
Westminster, 1931, as a Climax in its Relation to Canada, 10 CAN. BAR REV. 111 (1932); Driedger, 
Statute of Westminster and Constitutional Amendment, 11 CAN. BAR REV. 348 (1968); Goldenberg, The 
Problem of Constitutional Amendment in Canada, 6 CAN. POL. SCI. PROC. 238 (1934); Bastedo, Amend-
ing the British North America Act, 12 CAN. BAR REV. 209 (1934); WHEARE, STATUTE, supra note 21. 
See also note 22 supra, and note 34 infra. 
30. THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE DECREE OF 1926, CMD. No. 2768 (Gr. Britain 1926) 
[hereinafter cited as IMPERIAL CONFERENCE DECREE OF 1926). The decree spoke to several impor-
tant matters. First, it declared that Great Britain and other members ofthe Commonwealth were 
"autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one 
to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common 
allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Na-
tions." /d. at 14. Second, with respect to amendment of the constitutions of Member 
Countries, the Conference disclosed that "the constitutional practice is that legislation by the 
Parliament of Westminster applying to a Dominion would only be passed with the consent of the 
Dominion concerned." Id. at 18. See notes 65-6, infra. This latter concept was incorporated and 
expanded in the Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4. See also THE IMPERIAL CON-
FERENCE DECREE OF 1930, CMD. No. 3717 (Gr. Britain 1930). See generally WHEARE, STATUTE, 
supra note 21, at 21-99, 122-38. 
31. Seals Act, 1939, 3 Geo. 6, c. 22. The Act established an official seal for Canada and de-
cided questions of protocol regulating the conduct of Canadian foreign relations officials and 
British officials involved in Canadian affairs. /d. 
32. Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor General of Canada, Oct. 1, 1947, 
reprinted in CAN. REV. STAT. app., at 445, doc. 35 (1970). The Letters Patent defined the power of 
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Unfortunately, the constitutional framework has proved to be inadequate. 
The insufficiency is evidenced in part by the numerous attempts undertaken 
in Canada to amend certain provisions of the BNA Act, and in part by the 
many proposals that have been advanced for an entirely new Canadian Con-
stitutionY Of importance to the subject matter of this Comment is the 
absence of effective amendment procedures within the BNA Act,H the fact 
the Governor-General of Canada, the chief representative of the British Crown, providing that he 
could exercise all powers belonging to England. /d. art. II. 
Consider that through efforts· culminating in the Letters Patent of 1947, "the royal prerogative 
to conclude treaties was progressively transferred by Britain to Canada .... [Since that time) 
there. has been no serious doubt ... , as to Canada's status as a fully independent, sovereign 
member of the international community." Morris, The Treaty-Ma1cing Power: A Caruulian Dilnnma, 
45 CAN. BAR REV. 482,484 (1967). See also notes 95-100 and accompanying text infra. See gttltrally 
R. STEWART, TREATY RELATIONS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS (1939); N. 
MANSERGH, SURVEY OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS: PROBLEMS OF EXTERNAL POLICY 
(1955); P. NOEL·BAKER, THE PRESENT JURIDICAL STATUS OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS IN INTER· 
NATIONAL LAW (1929). 
33. Within the last fifteen years, three federally-appointed commissions, convened in 1964-67, 
1968-69 and 1978-79, have come forward with various solutions to Canada's constitutional pro-
blems. See 1-4 ROYAL COMMISSION ON BI-LINGUALISM AND BI-CULTURALlSM: REPORT (Govern-
ment of Canada ed. 1964-67) (the recommendations of the Royal Commission in Volume I of this 
work led to the passage of the Official Languages Act, CAN. REV. STAT., c. 0-2 (1970) which is 
discussed at note 82 infra); CONFERENCE OF 1968-1969, supra note 15 ; TASK FORCE, supra note 3. 
In addition, former Canadian Premier Trudeau has proposed two different constitutions for 
Canada. Set GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PEOPLE OF CANADA: AN Ap-
PROACH TO THE OBJECTIVES OF CONFEDERATION, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE, AND THE INSTITUTIONS 
OF GOVERNMENT (1969); GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT BILL: 
TEXT AND EXPLANATORY NOTES (1978). 
34. Alone among federal states - indeed, among all self-governing countries - Canada 
has a Constitution without any comprehensive scheme for its amendment. The only 
method of amending this Constitution embodied in acts of Parliament of the United 
Kingdom or in documents depending on such acts is a new act of Parliament. 
GERIN-LAjOIE, supra note 15, at 33. 
Under the BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, a limited provision for amendment of the Con-
stitution, is found at § 92(1): 
The Amendment from Time to Time, notwithstanding anything in this Act, of the 
Constitution of the Province, except as regards the Office of the Lieutenant Governor. 
/d. § 92(1). 
Obviously, the ability of the Provincial legislatures to amend the Constitution of the Province 
can have but a peripheral effect on the Federal Constitution. 
Since that time, the BNA Act (No.2) 1949, 13 Geo. 6, c. 81, has added § 91(1) to the BNA 
Act, 1867 , 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. This section gave the federal government the power to amend the 
Canadian Constitution with the exception of any provincial legislative prerogatives and 
numerous other matters. /d. Thus, the power applies only to matters of a strictly federal nature. 
See Scott, The British North America Act (No.2) 1949, 7 U. TORONTOL. J. 352 (1950); Finkelman, 
Rtcttlt Amttldmmts to Canada's Constitution, 7 U. TORONTO L. J. 201 (1950). Set also note 53 infra. 
Strong evidence suggests that the absence of a procedure for amendment was intentional as the 
founders believed that as the Union developed, the Federal Parliament would eventually assume 
the exclusive power to amend. Rogers, The Constitutional Impasse, 41 QUEEN'S QUAR. 482 (1934); 
GERIN-LAjOIE, supra note 15, at 35-40. 
On the topic of constitutional amendment in Canada, see gttltrally Driedger, Constitutional 
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that the Constitution is not yet fully patriated,35 and the status of provincial 
versus federal power. 36 
B. Quebec's Abiliry to Secede 
1. Provisions of the BNA Act 
The 'federal' nature of the BNA Act (and hence the Canadian Confedera-
Amendment in Canada, 5 CAN. BAR REV. 52 (1962); Donnelly, Constitutional Amendment in Canada, 4 
PARL. AFF. 443 (1951); Gerin-Lajoie, Du Pouvoir d' Amendement Constitutionnel au Canada, 29 
CAN. BAR REV. 1136 (1951); Livingston, The Amending Power oj the Canadian Parliament, 45 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 437 (1951); See notes 22, 29 supra. 
35. "Formal steps to incorporate a domestic amending procedure into the BNA Act may be 
said to date from the discussions at the Dominion-Provincial Conference of 1927 ... " LASKIN. 
supra note 21, at 35 .. Attempts were also made to patriate the Constitution in 1931, 1935, 1950, 
1960, 1964, and 1968-71. For discussion of the two most recent attempts, see notes 51-52 irifra. 
The patriation problem results from the following set of events. Canada can pass a law repug-
nant to an act of the British Parliament only when that Parliament passes an act allowing Canada 
to do so. Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865,28 & 29 Vict., c. 63. The Statute of Westminster, 22 
Geo. 5, c. 4, preserved the applicability of the Validity Act to the BNA Acts of 1867-1930 and 
other acts made thereunder. /d. § 7(1). The BNA Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, is an act of the 
British Parliament, and any amendment to it would require the approval of that Parliament. See 
generally CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICA 
ACT: PROCEEDINGS, EVIDENCE AND REPORT (1935). 
36. The federal structure of the Canadian Union has been marked by numerous problems 
concerning the appropriate distribution of legislative power consonant with SS 91 (detailing the 
powers of the Federal Parliament) and 92 (outlining the exclusive powers of the Provincial 
Legislatures) ofthe BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 S§ 91-92. Many attempts have been made 
to resolve the difficulties inherent in Canada's Constitution. See generally GOVERNMENT OF 
CANADA, PRECIS OF DISCUSSIONS: DOMINION-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE OF 1927 (1928); 
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, DOMINION, PROVINCIAL AND INTERPROVINCIAL CONFERENCES FROM 
1887 TO 1926 (1951); GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, DOMINION-PROVINCIAL OF CONFERENCE 1935: 
PROCEEDINGS (1936); GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, ROYAL COMMISSION ON DOMINION-
PROVINCIAL RELATIONS: REPORT (1940); GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, DOMINION-PROVINCIAL 
CONFERENCE OF 1941 (1941); GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, DOMINION-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE 
OF 1945 (1946); GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE FEDERAL AND 
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS: PROCEEDINGS (1951); GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, REPORT OF THE 
ROYAL COMMISSION ON FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS (1963); GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, 
FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE OF 1964: REPORT (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 CON-
FERENCE). See also note 33 supra. 
Note that since 1950 the Conferences have been billed as 'Federal-Provincial' ones and not 
'Dominion-Provincial.' The terminology was changed out of respect for the opinion of French-
Canadians that the word 'dominion' implied that the federal government was superior to the Pro-
vinces, a situation at odds with the operation of a true confederation. WHEARE, FEDERAL, supra 
note 22, at 13-14. This insistence on a shift of terminology reflects an essential difference between 
the English and French. See note 4 supra. Consider that i 
[t )he difference is rooted in the history of the Confederation and the place ofthe French 
Canadians in the Canadian federal state ... Quebecois regard Quebec as "the national 
patrimony" of a unique people. This conception of the Quebec government predates 
the modern crisis of Quebec-Ottawa relations and has been assumed by all Quebec pro-
vincial regimes of whatever political label. 
LAXER & LAXER, supra note 10; at 200. See also NEW DEAL, supra note 7, at 17. 
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tion) is referred to only at three points within the text of the ActY "Secession 
is not a concept recognized in the BNA Act or in any other form of constitu-
tional norm or convention.' '38 The Act addresses only the admission,39 not the 
secession of provinces. 
There is some dispute as to the significance that should be attached to this 
silence concerning the possibility of the secession of one of Canada's member-
states. On the one hand, it is argued that the absence of an express recognition 
of a right to secede does not necessarily imply that such a power could not be 
exercised under any circumstances. +0 Furthermore, the BNA Act did not pro-
hibit expressly the secession of one of its constituent units thereby retaining the 
possibility of secession. This is the situation in the constitution of at least one 
other member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, Australia'" Since the 
passage of the BNA Act, there has not been any judicial decision, as has been 
the case in the United States,+2 precisely forbidding such an action. On the 
other hand, it is argued that the very decision to form a federal union 
37. The title of the BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, discloses that it is an "Act for the 
Union of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and the Government thereof; and for Pur-
poses connected therewith." Id. In the preamble, reference is made to the desire of the four prov-
inces to federate as a dominion. Id. Preamble. In the third article of preliminary remarks, it is 
mentioned that from the date of the Act's signing, the provinces will constitute a dominion under 
the name of Canada. Id. art. II, S 3. 
38. Claydon & Whyte, Legal Aspects of Quebec'S Claim, in MUST CANADA FAIL, supra note 15, at 
274 [hereinafter cited as Claydon & Whyte). 
39. See The BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, art. 146. Note that under this section it is for 
the Queen, with the advice of the Privy Council (now abolished) and the appropriate legislative 
bodies, to decide whether new colonies were to be admitted. Id. Under the BNA Act, 1871,34 & 
35 Vict., c. 28, the Parliament of Canada was given the power to establish and make provision 
for new provinces to be created out of the territories, that is, the North-western Territories and 
Rupert's Land. Id. S II. This section, however, was not incorporated into S 146 of the BNA Act, 
1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. See note 25 supra. 
40. See, e.g., BROSSARD, supra note 10, at 96-97,252-53. 
41. The preamble to the Australian Constitution states that the colonies"have agreed to unite 
into one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth". Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 
1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12. Presumably, the British Parliament included these words at the re-
quest of Australia herself. BROSSARD, supra note 10, at 253. The Constitution contains a com-
prehensive amending procedure, but secession "could not be achieved through the process of 
constitutional amendment .... " GERIN-LAJOIE,supra note 15, at 144. See also id. at 35; WHEARE, 
FEDERAL, supra note 22, at 59-63, 65-68; Mayer, Legal Aspects of Secession, 3 MANITOBA L. J. 61 
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Mayer). See also note 61 infra. 
42. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868). The case arose out of Texas' attempt to 
secede from the Union. The questions settled by the Court dealt with the competency of revolu-
tionary authorities to sue in court, the status of the State after a declaration of withdrawal, the 
position of alienated property seized by a rebellious government to wage war and the marketabil-
ity of bonds taken by the insurgents. In the course of its discussions, the Court noted: 
The Union of States never was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation .... It was con-
firmed and strengthened by the necessities of war, and received definite form, and 
character, and sanction from the Articles of Confederation .... [W)hen these Articles 
were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the Constitution was or-
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engenders expectations of stability and longevity which make the notion of 
secession, unless expressly reserved within the text of a constitution, mcom-
patible with the theory of federalism. 43 Indeed, 
It is certainly questionable whether the "right" of secession is 
compatible with federal government itself. The creation of a 
federal state includes a permanent commitment to collaborate ac-
cording to the terms set forth in the constitution. That the terms 
include the right not to collaborate is self-contradictory ... States 
cannot be made to judge the legitimacy of federal law if, in fact, 
there is to be a federal government ... 
The experience of other Commonwealth countries suggests that Quebec 
could not legally repudiate the BNA Act and declare itself independent.45 
Assuming, arguendo, the propriety of this view, 46 the Province of Quebec would 
be forced to proceed with an attempt to amend the Canadian Constitution to 
allow it to secede from the ConfederationY However, substantial problems 
face Quebec in any attempt to alter the terms of the BNA Act. 
dained "to form a more perfect Union." It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble 
unity more clearly than by these words . . . . 
The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of 
indestructible States. 
/d. at 724-25. 
As for members ofthe British Commonwealth, "although the Privy Council has confirmed the 
provinces in a wide range of powers, it has never said anything to support the right of the Prov-
inces to withdraw from confederation." J. CORRY & J. HODGE1TS, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 
AND POLITICS 559 (1959). 
Consider also that" some of the states which ratified the American and Australian Constitu-
tions assumed that the right of withdrawal remained intact. The states of Virginia, Rhode Island 
and New York all reserved such a right in their ratification resolutions." C. Friedrich, Studies in 
Federalism: The Admission of New States, Secession and Territorial Adjustments 8 (1952) (un-
published thesis in Harvard Legal Studies Library) (hereinafter cited as Friedrich). 
43. The coming together as a federal state creates expectations about what values may be 
enhanced and what values may be pursued at the national level. When one province 
seeks to leave the union, the pattern of union is fundamentally altered and the expec-
tations about the country must undergo change. 
Claydon & Whyte, supra note 38, at 275. 
44. Friedrich, supra note 42, at 12. Some of the disadvantages Professor Friedrich lists include 
allowing an ultimate veto power for each state and discouraging united economic activity. /d. But 
see WHEARE, FEDERAL, supra note 22, at 91. 
45. One example is the case of Rhodesia. Prime Minister Ian Smith wished to repudiate the 
Rhodesian Constitution and declare his party to be the legally appropriate government. The 
Rhodesian Supreme Court declared his actions to be illegal in Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-
Burke, (1969) 1 A.C. 645. One commentator has concluded that "the Rhodesian case is valid 
precedent for a decision that Quebec has no legal right to repudiate the BNA Act and declare 
itself to be an independent state." Mayer, supra note 41, at 70. See also note 47 infra. 
46. This is a view which finds general concurrence. See E. FORSEY, SEPARATION OF QUEBEC: 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 6 (1976); TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 113. This is true for at 
least one other member of the British Commonwealth - Australia. See WHEARE, FEDERAL, supra 
note 22, at 86. See also note 34 supra. 
47. See note 170 infra. 
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2. The Procedure for Constitutional Amendment 
There are two paths that Quebec could follow in seeking to amend the Con-
stitution, i.e., the BNA Act, to authorize political sovereignty for the Prov-
ince. First, the provincial government, presumably after receiving some type 
of mandate in a referendum, could unilaterally render an appeal to the British 
Parliament requesting relief from that body. 48 Second, the British Parliament 
could entertain a motion from the Parliament of Canada requesting permis-
sion to amend the Constitution. 49 It is important to note that either procedure 
would require that a final, although purely formal, decision be rendered by 
Westminster since "Canada has not yet taken possession of full domestic 
authority to amend the BNA Act, in particular, that part dealing with the 
distribution of powers between provincial and federal governments remains 
with the United Kingdom Parliament which acts at Canada's request. "50 
Within the last fifteen years, two major efforts which were undertaken to 
fully patriate the Constitution resulted in the Fulton-Favreau Formula of 
196451 and the Victoria Charter Plan of 1971.52 Both proposals were ulti-
mately vetoed by Quebec after disagreements arose as to certain features of 
the plans. 53 Between 1968-1979, the former Prime Minister of Canada, M. 
48. See notes 56-64 irifra. 
49. BLACK, supra note 20, at 13. 
50. GERIN.LAjOIE, supra note 15, at 136. 
51. The plan, originally called the Fulton Formula, came out of a Conference of Attorney-
Generals convened in 1960-61. See GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, CONFERENCE OF ATTORNEY· 
GENERALS(1961). It was rejected by two provinces at that point. See note 53 irifra. At the Federal-
Provincial Conference of 1964, supra note 36, the plan was reconsidered. It resulted in the Fulton-
Favreau Formula, the contents of which have been summarized as follows: 
1) no law relating to the legislative powers of the provinces, to provincial assets or prop' 
erty, to the use of the French and English languages, to provincial representation in 
Parliament or to the amendment procedure should go into effect without the unanimous 
consent of the provinces of Canada; 
2) no law affecting one or more provinces, but not all of them, should go into effect 
without the assent of the provinces concerned, ... 
3) no law relating to any other provision of the constitution should go into effect without 
the consent of two-thirds of the provinces of Canada embodying fifty percent of the 
population. 
STANLEY, HISTORY, supra note 6, at 169. See also Brady, Constitutional Amendment and the Federation, 
29 CAN.]. ECON. & POL. 486 (1963); Alexander, A Constitutional StraitJacket for Canada, 43 CAN. 
BAR REV. 262 (1965); Laskin, Amendment of the Constitution: Applying the Fulton-Favreau Formula, 11 
MCGILLL.]. 1 (1965). 
52. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER, 1971 (1971) 
[hereinafter cited VICTORIA CHARTER]. This proposal for a new Constitution was the product of 
several years of negotiations between provincial and federal leaders. &e CONFERENCE OF 
1968-1969, supra note 15. 
Arts. 49-57 of the Charter laid out a complicate scheme for provincial approval of constitu-
tional amendments. VICTORIA CHARTER, supra, arts. 49-57. See R. SIMEON, FEDERAL-
PROVINCIAL DIPLOMACY 119 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SIMEON]. Quebec did not approve the 
Charter. &e note 53 infra. 
53. When the Fulton Plan was first proposed in 1961, the Province of Saskatchewan was op-
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Pierre Trudeau, dedicated himself to altering the present constitution to fulfill 
his party's promise of unity for Canada; yet, during that period, not one word 
of the original BNA Act was changed. H Prior attempts to alter the Constitu-
tion and/or the amending process were similarly unsuccessful, although 
Quebec did not always oppose them. 55 
There is precedent to support a direct appeal by a provincial legislature to 
London. Nova Scotia made such an appeal in 1868 to allege a lack of consent 
to the terms of the Union. 56 Other instances include: 1) the address to the 
Queen made by the Province of Ontario in 1868;57 2) the addresses made by 
the Province of Prince Edward Island in 187758 and 1882;59 3) the appeals 
made to London by British Columbia in 187460 and 1908;61 4) the appeal of 
posed to the loss of provincial powers and Quebec was opposed to the continued vitality of the 
BNA Act (No.2), 1949, 13 Geo. 6, c. 81. See LASKIN. supra note 21, at 36. For a discussion of the 
BNA Act (No.2), 1949, 13 Geo. 6, c. 81, see note 34 supra. 
At the 1964 CONFERENCE, supra note 36, a version of the plan, altering policy with respect to S 
91(1) of the BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Viet., c. 3 was presented, and received the approval of all 
the provincial premiers. However, nationaIist opposition in Quebec, concerned about the 
distribution of powers, prevented the Lesage Liberal government from seeking provincial 
legislative approval of the plan. See [1965) CANADA ANNUAL REVIEW, 47-53 O. Saywell ed. 1966). 
Opposition in Quebec to the VICTORIA CHARTER, supra note 52, was widespread and cut across 
party lines. Quebeckers were most upset about provisions in the Charter which frustrated their 
desire to exercise greater control over social policy programs. See SIMEON, supra note 52, at 
120-22. See also NEW DEAL, supra note 7, at 39-40. 
54. Talking a Good Game, MACLEANS, Feb. 19, 1979, at 15. 
55. The problem often was the inability of conferees to develop any amendment proposals at 
all. See LASKIN, supra note 21, at 35-36. 
56: See note 14 supra. 
57. The Province of Ontario, through the Governor-General, appealed to London because it 
felt that the increased monies given to Nova Scotia by the Ottawa Government contravened § 118 
of the BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. The Colonial Office responded: 
The British North America Act (1867) embodied the terms of Confederation agreed 
upon through their Representatives by the different Provinces of the Union, and Her 
Majesty's Government would not feel justified in proposing to the Imperial Parliament 
to deprive the Parliament of Canada of any power which the Act has assigned to them. 
Granville to the Governor-General, February 19, 1870, 1870 CAN. SESS. PAPERS No. 25, at 14, 
reprinted in relevant part in GERIN·LAJOIE, supra note 15, at 141. 
58. In that year, Prince Edward Island addressed the Queen as result of a fishing dispute, but 
London would not intercede. See BROSSARD, supra note 10, at 278. 
59. In this instance, Prince Edward Island again appealed to the Queen, through the 
Governor-General, over a dispute involving the building of a transcontinental railway in the 
Province. The Islanders claimed that the federal government failed to adhere to its contractual 
obligations for the project. The Province was informed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
"that the Queen had no power either by statute or otherwise, under the constitution of Canada, 
to give any direction in the matter .... " Maxwell, supra note 15, at 745. 
60. This petition to London also involved the building of a transcontinental railway. It was 
turned down due to lack of support from Ottawa. See Mayer, supra note 41, at 64. 
61. This appeal to London involved British Columbia's opposition to an amendment to the 
tax-sharing provisions in the BNA Act under which the Province felt its share would be insuffi-
cient. For a discussion of the complexities of this case, see Maxwell, supra note 15, at 748-49. 
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the State of Western Australia in 1935;62 5) the request made by the Province 
of Quebec through the Governor-General (the Crown's chief representative in 
Canada) in 1965.63 All of these requests were denied, except the request by 
Quebec, which was ignored. 6. 
Thus, it is unlikely that Westminster would ever accept this manner of ap-
peal to establish an independent Quebec. Such a request would involve a fun-
damental reordering of the Canadian Confederation and would occur without 
any direct support from the central government in Ottowa. History has shown 
that Britain would not impair the Confederation's power balance. 65 
A second, more practical method of amending the Constitution, would be 
for Ottowa to petition London directly. This would occur if the Federal 
Government, having decided to accede to the demands of the independantistes, 
62. In 1935, the State of Western Australia appealed to both houses of Parliament asking that 
the Australian Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12, be amended so as to allow the State 
to secede. See REPORT BY THEJ OINT COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT ON THE PETITION OF THE STATE 
OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA (1935), (Hse. Lds. Doc. 75, Hse. Cmns. Doc. 88) [hereinafter cited as 
JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT). "The petition had passed through both Houses of the State 
Legislature and was signed by the leaders of all political parties. In addition, the petition was 
backed up by a referendum in which two-thirds of the state's voters had expressed a desire to 
separate." Mayer, supra note 41, at 63. The petition arose subsequent to referendums held under 
the Secession Referendum Act, 1932,23 Geo. 5, No. 47 (Aus.), and the Secession Act, 1934,25 
Geo. 5, No.2 (Aus.). See GOVERNMENT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, CASE OF THE PROVINCE OF 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA. iii-iv (1934). A committee of members of the House of Lords and Com-
mons refused to hear the petition because the State had no locus standi to ask that the Constitution 
of Australia be altered. JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at ix. The Committee went on to say 
that" interference should only take place at the request of such Dominion ... speaking with the 
voice which represents it as a whole and not merely the request of a minority. That rule was well 
established before 1900, and has consistently been acted upon as an undoubted Constitutional 
Convention." Id. at viii. One author comments: 
The result was somewhat paradoxical. The Commonwealth Parliament does not 
possess the power to enable a state to secede because the Australian Constitution 
created "an indissoluble Federal Commonwealth." Secession can only be affected by 
an Imperial Act. Yet the Imperial Parliament will exercise its power only at the request 
of the Commonwealth. 
Maxwell, supra note 15, at 738. 
63. "In 1965, the Lesage Government decided to abolish the Legislative Council of Quebec, 
given that its existence and composition was predetermined by articles 71 and 79 of the BNA Act 
of 1867." BOSSARD, supra note 1 0, at 281 (author's translation). After numerous discussions with 
federal officials, the Governor-General transmitted the Quebec proposal to the Queen, under-
lining that the Ottawa Cabinet felt that Quebec's desires should be respected. See Lederman, The 
Process rif Constitutional Amendment in Canada, 12 MCGILL L. J. 336, 371 (1966). London did 
nothing with the proposal and the Council was later abolished. An Act respecting the Legislative 
Council, Que. Stat., c. 9 (1968). 
64. See notes 15, 57-63 supra. 
65. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, FEDERATION AND THE FUTURE: THE AMENDMENT OF THE CON-
STITUTION IN CANADA 11 (1965) [hereinafter cited as WHITE PAPER); accord, Forsey, supra note 46, 
at 8-9. That provinces may not unilaterally appeal is a matter of constitutional convention. See 
GERIN-LAJOIE, supra note 15, at 138. 
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secured the approval of the other provinces for such a petition.66 Ottowa has 
not always sought the blessing of the provinces before petitioning London. 67 
However, given the present political climate, it is doubtful that a petition for 
the establishment of an independent Quebec could gain the support of other 
provincial leaders or of the Canadian population. Public opinion in Canada 
currently is against such a course of action. 68 
There remains the question of whether Canada should accede to a strong 
demand, evidenced by a legitimate referendum of the voters of Quebec, man-
dating that the provincial government proceed with negotiations to attain the 
sovereignty of Quebec. Most of the federally-appointed constitutional com-
missions convened within the last twenty-five years have recommended that 
the express desire of the people of Quebec be respected. 69 Nevertheless, the 
66. WHITE PAPER, supra note 65, at 11. There are three basic reasons for the need for provin· 
cial approval. First, under the BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 the Provincial Legislatures 
were given the power to amend the Constitution of the Province. [d. S 92(1). By the specific terms 
of S 92, Provinces retained the exclusive right to make laws on a whole range of concerns. Id. S 92 
See note 36 supra. Thus, the federal governm~nt cannot endeavor to amend the constitution on a 
matter that would infringe upon provincial concerns without the approval of the provinces. See 
GERIN·LAJOIE, supra note 15, at 158·60. Note, however, that the central government is able to 
disallow or reserve provincial acts. BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, arts. 56·57. See CANADA: 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DISALWWANCE AND RESERVATION OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION 
(1955). 
Second, the IMPERIAL CONFERENCE DECREE OF 1926, supra note 30, affirmed that Westminster 
would not interfere with the powers of the respective legislative bodies of Canada. /d. at 14. 
Thus, an attempt by the Ottawa Parliament to amend the Constitution, outside of those areas 
delimited by the provisions of § 91(1) of the BNA Act, 1867, 30 & 31, Vict., c. 3 as altered by the 
BNA Act (No.2), 1949, 13 Geo. 6, c. 81, would not be approved. See note 34 supra. The principle 
of 'exclusive powers' embodied in the BNA Act was reaffirmed by the Statute of Westminster, 
1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 44 § 7(3). 
Finally, as a matter of convention, Westminster has heeded the appeals of provinces in several 
situations where the provinces objected to unilateral federal attempts at amendment. GERIN· 
LAJOIE, supra note 15, at 193·94. Cj note 67 irifra. 
67. LASKIN, supra note 22, lists eight amendments that were enacted by the United Kingdom 
Parliament even though provinces were not consulted. The last three amendments to the BNA 
Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, have received the unanimous approval of the provinces. /d. at 
35·36. See also BROSSARD, supra note 10, at 260·61. It is submitted that a question of provincial 
separation so involves the federal· provincial relationship, that Ottawa could never proceed abo 
sent unanimous provincial consent. 
68. For example, a Gallup poll has found that only 15% of the Canadians outside of Quebec 
favor complete independence while 76% are opposed to such a move. Moreover only 20% of 
these same people favor the sovereignty·association option with 67% opposed. The Quebec Ques· 
tion,. Montreal Gazette, Jan. 31, 1979, S A, at 2, col. 2. As for voters within the Province of 
Quebec, the most recent poll, conducted after the P. Q. announced its referendum question, (see 
note 19supra), indicates that the party's initiative may fail. See 47.2 p.c. dis Quebecois repondraient 
par un non lors du riferendum, La Presse, Montreal, Dec. 26, 1979, S A, at 2, col. 3. 
69. See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 3: 
[IJt is for the people of Quebec to declare themselves on their political and constitu· 
tional preferences, and not the country as a whole; it is important, therefore, that 
whatever process is employed to determine the will of the people of Quebec is ac· 
cepted as legitimate by both governments. 
/d. at 114. 
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prevailing opinion among Canada's political leaders, both past and present, is 
reflected in the view held by former Prime Minister Trudeau, that there is 
"only one set of formulae which we are not willing to discuss (in terms of con-
stitutional reform): those which commence with the premise that Canada is-
or could be - anything other than one unified country. "70 Beyond such 
philosophical barriers to separation,71 there also is strong opposition to in-
dependence based upon economics, national survival, and the impact of 
separation upon French-Canadians residing outside the Province of Quebec. 
As has been seen,12 resistance to the concept of a sovereign Quebec with an 
economic association to the rest of Canada has developed due to the percep-
tion that the benefits of interprovincial tariff protection would continue to flow 
to Quebec without its sharing in the costs of that protection through the 
maintenance ofthe Confederation. 73 The response of the P. Q. to such a posi-
tion is that an economic association is inevitable and that it unquestionably 
would benefit both Quebec and Canada. 74 The political posturing is clear. 
The P. Q. must convince the rest of the country that its plan of sovereignty-
association provides the sole means through which the rift in the Canadian 
political union can be conclusively resolved. However, Ottowa must convince 
Quebeckers that the Province could not survive without tariff protection and 
the federal program of equalization and transfer payments. The Government 
asserts that Quebec receives more benefits under these programs than any 
other province. 75 
70. Costello, Quebec's Separatism, 11 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP. 845 (1977). 
71. The maintenance of the Union has always been uppermost in the minds of many Cana-
dian political leaders, including Quebec Prime Ministers Lesage (1960-65), Johnson (1966-68), 
and Bourassa (1970-76). See Opening Statement by M. Pearson, in CONFERENCE 1968-1969, supra note 
15, at 11; Opening Statement by M. Trudeau, in CONFERENCE 1968-1969, id. at 31; Opening Statement 
by M. Johnson, in CONFERENCE 1968-1969, id. at 69. See also TASK FORCE supra note 3, where the 
Committee indicates that any new constitution should reinforce federalism. Id.at 81. 
72. See note 18 supra. 
73. If Quebec separated, "there would be no economic reason for the Canadian provinces-
particularly those in the Western and Atlantic regions - to accept a higher level of e::ternal tariffs 
than their export-based economies need and higher prices for goods from Quebec than from other 
countries." Smiley, supra note 14, at 218. See also THE EcONOMIST, supra note 18, at 92 n. 1. 
74. Premier Levesque has remarked that sovereignty-association "will not only be acceptable 
but even desirable because of the alternative prospect of a special status that would be grabbed by 
Quebec, bit by bit, until the federal state became kind of a constitutional freak in perpetual 
danger of disintegration." OPTION FOR QUEBEC, supra note 18, at 35. See also Levesque, For an In-
dependmt OJubec, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 734, 741-42 (1976) [hereinafer cited as Levesque, Independmt 
OJubec). 
75. By far the most important of the explicitly redistributive programs is the rev-
enue equalization scheme by which Ottawa makes direct payments to the govern-
ments of the poor provinces in order to bring their revenues up to the national 
average. In 1976, equalization payments transferred almost $1 billion to Quebec, 
about half the total sum involved. 
Leslie & Simeon, The lJaJtle of the Balance Sheets, in MUST CANADA FAIL. supra note 15, at 247,249. 
That Quebec does benefit from this program is a matter of considerable disagreement. It has 
been maintained that funds to finance projects in the rest of Canada are being taken out of 
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In addition, many English-Canadians believe that their Union would fall 
apart if Quebec were permitted to secede. This fear is rooted in the inability of 
the central government to exercise effective control over the provinces. 
Perhaps this constitutes an appropriate shortcoming in a true confederation. 76 
The Atlantic provinces, which include Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, 
New Brunswick and Newfoundland, appear to be particularly susceptible if 
Quebec is able to secede from Canada. This is because of their traditional 
dissatisfaction with the Confederation and because they will be physically 
separated from the rest of the country. 77 Conversely, the P. Q. believes that 
only through resolution of the problem of Quebec (by a declaration of its 
sovereignty) can Canada begin to construct a truly unified country which is 
distinct and economically independent of the United States. 78 
It has also been argued that "secession might have the consequence of 
leaving those members of a minority (French) living in other areas of the 
country without their traditional protection they had previously enjoyed as 
part of a powerful minority. "79 If Quebec seceded, French-speakers in 
Canada would constitute about 5 % of the population, as opposed to 27 % at 
present. 80 Thus, federalists urge thai, absent Quebec, the impetus for federal 
and provincial programs guaranteeing language rights for the French in other 
parts of Canada would disappear. 8 ! However, the separatists consider present 
guarantees to be so lacking in security that any loss of federal initiatives would 
not result in substantial injury to the remaining French-Canadian populace. 82 
Quebec.Id. at 247-48. Ottawa has responded by noting that many factors left out of the formula, 
such as the balance of merchandise trade, and the flows of interests and dividends between 
Quebec and the outside, skewed the estimate. Id. In any event, the P.Q.'s position is that its 
burden of contributions to the federal government will be reduced in many areas such as defense, 
foreign aid and so forth, which will more than make up for any loss. OPTION FOR QUEBEC, supra 
note 18, at 49-50. For background to the early development of transfer payment programs in 
Canada, see Brady, THE MODERN FEDERATION: SOME TRENDS AND PROBLEMS, in 3 ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE, supra note 21, at 24. See also notes 18, 73 supra. 
76. Murchland, Quebec's Politics of Vengeance, WORWVIEW 17, 18 (Jan.-Feb. 1978). 
77. See Rawlyk, Quebec's Separation and the Atlantic Provinces, in MUST CANADA FAIL, supra note 
15, at 85-92. Consider that it is the Western and Maritime Provinces that are suffering the most 
due to the Quebec-Ontario split. See D. BERCUSON, CANADA AND THE BURDEN OF UNITY 3 (1977). 
The P.Q. has indicated that they will allow free passage of goods across their borders. See note 18 
supra. 
78. See OPTION FOR QUEBEC, supra note 18, at 28; LEVESQUE, Independent Quebec, supra note 74, 
at 743. 
79. L. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF·DETERMINATION 30 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as BUCHHEIT]. 
80. See GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, 1976 CENSUS OF CANADA, CAT. No. 92-822, BULL. 2:2, 
Table 8-1 (1978). 
81. As for French minorities in other provinces, they can only have a future if Quebec 
establishes itself as a strong, progressive force within Confederation; if Quebec 
withdraws into itself or secedes, these French minorities will have approximately the 
same rights and the same influence as cultural groups of German origin in Canada. 
TRUDEAU, supra note 3, at 34. 
82. Quebec has two main objections to the Union in the area of language rights. First, many 
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It is apparent that, absent a shift in attitudes in favor of a sovereign Quebec, 
the support necessary for Ottowa to appeal to London so as to allow Quebec to 
secede will not be forthcoming. What remains, however, is the question of 
Quebeckers believe that other provinces have not respected the rights of French-speakers within 
their territory. Two chief examples are offered, those of Manitoba and Ontario. 
When the Province of Manitoba entered the Union in 1870, Francophones were in a slight ma-
jority. See NEW DEAL, supra note 7, at 10. Language guarantees in the Manitoba Act, 1870,33 
Vict., c. 3 at S 23 (Can.), providing that French and English were the official languages of the 
Courts and the Legislatures, were modeled after those in the BNA Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, 
at S 133. However, in 1890, English was declared to be the Province's sole official language. Set 
An Act to Provide that the English Language shall be the Official Language of the Province of 
Manitoba [Manitoba Language Act], 1890 (Man.), c. 14 (current version at MAN. REV. STAT. c. 
O-tO (1970». In that same year, the long-established system of Protestant (attended primarily by 
the English) and Catholic (attended primarily by the French) denominational schools was 
scrapped and a public school system was established. See Public Schools Act, 1890 (Man.), c. 38. 
A challenge to the constitutionality of the Act failed, as it was held that no rights of the groups 
had been prejudiced. See City of Winnipeg v. Barrett, (1892] A.C. 445. See also Brophy v. 
Attorney-General of Manitoba, [1895] A.C. 202. A recent challenge to the Manitoba Language 
Act, 1890 (Man.) c. 14 (current version at MAN.REV. STAT. c. 0-10 (1970», resulted in a declara-
tion of its unconstitutionality. See R. v. Forest, - D.L.R. 3d - (1979). See also Re Forest and 
Registrar of the Court of Appeal of Manitoba, 77 D.L.R. 3d 445 (1977); Giniger, Canada 
Language Rights Upheld, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1979, § A, at 10, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as 
Giniger, Language]. 
In Ontario, a dispute arose in 1913 over the issuance of Provincial Department of Education 
Regulation No. 17, which forbade the use of French in the classroom beyond Grade (Form) 1. 
Courts, in various challenges to Regulation 17, held it to be an appropriate exercise of provincial 
power in the field of education, guaranteed by the BNA Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 93. See 
McDonald v. Lancaster Separate Schools Trustees, 26 D.L.R. 731 (1916) (teachers fined for 
teaching catechism in French); McDonald v. Lancaster Separate Schools Trustees, 24 D.L.R. 
868 (1915) (injunction against using French in a Catholic school); Ottawa Separate Schools 
Trustees v. Mackell, [1917] A.C. 62 (province has power to issue regulations in area of educa-
tion, unless rights are prejudiced). Ottawa's policy was abandoned in 1927, with many excep-
tions to the 'no French'rule coming before that date. See J. HOPE, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COM· 
MISSION ON EDUCATION IN ONTARIO 260-61 (1950). Set also F. MERCHANT, REPORT OF THE COM· 
MISSION ApPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO THE CONDITIONS OF THE SCHOOLS ATTENDED BY FRENCH· 
SPEAKING PUPILS (1927). 
In all challenges to a province's control of the language of schools, "[c]ourts have distinguished 
between language and faith, ... never did they interpret the British North America Act, 1867, as 
an instrument for the protection of the language or the culture of a particular group." Protestant 
School Board of Montreal v. Minister of Education, 83 D.L.R. 3d 645,672. (1976). For a review 
of New Brunswick's language law, see Kerr, The Official Languages of New Brunswick Act, 20 U. 
TORONTO L. J. 478 (1970). See generally Mestral & Frailberg, Language guarantees and the Power to 
Amend the Canadian Constitution, 12 MCGILL L. J. 502 (1966). 
Quebec's second major objection is that the French language is not adequately supported. This 
lack of support for the French language is reflected in the rapid rate of assimilation by the French 
with the English. Assimilation is having a marked effect outsid~ of Quebec. Whereas in 1951, 
82% of all French-speakers lived in Quebec, by 1976 that proportion had risen to 85% and is ex-
pected to rise to 95% by the year 2001. See TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 46-47. Moreover, it is 
predicted by one demographer, that by 1991, 73% of all people of French origin living outside the 
Province of Quebec will have stopped using the French language. NEW DEAL, supra note 7, at 
28-29. Finally, as to immigrants settling in the Province, a great majority of them choose English 
and not French as their primary language. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 47. 
In response to these trends, Quebec's legislature passed two language acts during the 1970's. 
The first, the Official Languages Act [Bill 22], Que. Stat. c. 6 (1974), was replaced by the 
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whether the central government could transfer sufficient power to satisfy the 
desire of the Province for greater autonomy without the need to withdraw 
from the Confederation. The effect of this shift of power would be to give the 
Province a 'special status' within the Confederation. 
C. Special Status (Statut Particulier): The 'Third Option' 
1. Overview of the 'Third Option' 
The distinct nature of the Province of Quebec in matters affecting language 
rights,S3 education,s. and legislation,s5 is acknowledged within the BNA Act. 
An option which has found favor among supporters of a united Canada in-
volves amending the BNA to enable Quebec to exercise increased legislative 
Charter of the French Language Act [Bill 101), Que. Stat. c. 5 (1977), when the P. Q. came to 
power. 
The latter bill was of far-reaching scope as. it makes French the language of work, instruction, 
communication, commerce and business. /d. Preamble, para. 2. In addition, it declared French 
to be the official language of Quebec, id. art. 1, and required that French be the language of the 
Legislature, id. arts. 7-10, and of the Courts, id. arts. 11-13. The articles concerning the 
legislatures and the courts have recently been declared unconstitutional, in violation of the BNA 
Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 S 133, as the Province was held impotent to amend that section. See 
Blaikie v. Attorney-General of Quebec, 85 D.L.R. 3d 252 (1978), aff'd, - D.L:R. 3d - (1979). 
This decision is expected to give support to the separatist cause. See Giniger, Language, supra. See 
generally Comment, Language Rights and Quebec Bill 101, 10 CASE W. RES J. INT'L L. 543 (1978); 
GENDRON COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL· LEGAL COMPETENCE AS TO 
EsTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OR LANGUAGES IN QUEBEC (Editeur officiel de Quebec 
1972). See also note 11. 
In 1969, the Federal Government, in an attempt to bolster bilingualism, passed the Official 
Languages Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 0-2 (1970). This Act extended the provisions of the BNA Act, 
1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 S 133 to all institutions of the federal government. The constitutionality 
of the legislation was upheld in Jones v. Attorney-General of Canada, 45 D.L.R. 3d 583 (1974). 
In its implementation, however, the Act has been inadequate. See TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 
49-50; NEW DEAL, supra note 7, at 12. See generally Bujold, Language Rights in the Canadian Constitu-
tion, 26 U. NEW BRUNS, L. J. 47 (1977). 
83. Section 133 of the BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 states in pertinent part: 
Either the English or the French Language may be used by any Person in the 
Debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada and of the Houses of the 
Legislature of Quebec; and both those Languages shall be used in the respective 
Records and Journals of those Houses; and either of those Languages may be used 
by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court of 
Canada established under this Act, and in or from all or any of the Courts of 
Quebec .... 
[d. See also note 82 supra. 
84. Section 93(2) of the BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, extended equality of status to the 
Roman Catholic Separate schools in Quebec. /d. 
85. Section 94 of the BNA Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, provided that the Parliament of 
Canada could make uniform the laws respecting property and civil rights in Ontario, New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia but only ifthe legislatures ofthose provinces approved of the uniform 
change. /d. The Province of Quebec was excluded from this uniformity out of respect for its 
distinct legal system, the Civil Code. See notes 5-8 supra. 
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prerogatives. This could be effected in two ways. First, in contentious areas 
such as language policy,86 foreign relations,87 and social policy,88 Quebec 
could be given exclusive legislative powers. Second, certain powers could be 
placed under the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and provincial govern-
ments to give the provinces the option to legislate in fields involving their par-
ticular interests. 
It is clear that the first alternative is a compromise position.89 Special status 
has the strong support of Quebec's official opposition party, the Liberals, 
headed by M. Claude Ryan.90 Despite the fact that a Liberal government has 
been in power at the federal level during most of this decade, that Govern-
ment, led by M. Trudeau, consistently rejected the notion of a special status 
for Quebec. 91 The second alternative finds some favor in those provinces, 
which, like Quebec, desire greater provincial autonomy. 92 
2. Delegation of Powers in Canada 
Among all the provinces, Quebec has historically supported greater political 
autonomy. This is a function of its desire to preserve both its heritage and the 
terms under which it entered the Confederation.93 As a result, Quebec has 
86. See notes 11, 82 supra. 
87. See notes 95-100 infra. 
88. The Federal Parliamenfproceeded, in 1944, to introduce a scheme of family allow-
ances, to extend the scope of the unemployment insurance program and to provide 
old age security (1951). At the same time the Federal Government undertook to grant 
financial assistance on a shared-cost basis, including help to the blind (1951) and dis-
abled (1954) and hospital insurance to all Canadians (1958). These measures were 
followed in 1965 by the Canadian Pension Plan, and in 1968, by a countrywide 
Medicare scheme. All such social welfare measures ... , were an invasion of fields 
constitutionally and traditionally the responsibility of the Canadian provinces. 
STANLEY, HISTORY, supra note 7, at 161-62. Many of the shared-cost programs allowed the prov-
inces the option of assuming the full burden of administering and financing the efforts. Only 
Quebec has done so. See note 94 infra. 
89. Consider that, when first proposed, special status "provided an acceptable option for na-
tionalists who otherwise might become separatists." Brady, The Distrihution of Legislative POW", in 
2 ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 21, at 101-02 [hereinafter cited as Brady). 
90. As head of the Liberal Party in Quebec, Mr. Ryan inherits a long tradition of support for 
the idea of special status. See Brady, supra note 89, at 100-03. Mr. Ryan has long been a supporter 
of this option. See Ryan, The Possihle Contents of a Special Status for Quehec, in QUEBEC IN THE 
CANADA OF TOMORROW, S E-l (1967). He envisions a transfer of powers to the provinces in the 
areas of social welfare, education, foreign relations, communications, immigration, and 
economic development. /d. 
91. M.Trudeau believed that special status would weaken the French position in Canada, see 
note 81 supra, lead to its alienation rather than unification with the rest of Canada, and cause it to 
have less effective representation at the federal level. See LAXER & LAXER, supra note 10, at 
313-16; D. SMILEY, CANADA IN QUESTION 163 (1972). 
92. Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan may support efforts for delegation of powers. See Brady, 
supra note 89, at 102. 
93. See S 1 supra. 
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taken the lead in establishing provincial programs when the central govern-
ment has allowed the provinces to opt out of co-operative programs. 94 
An area that exemplifies Quebec's inclination towards greater autonomy is 
that of foreign relations, especially in Quebec's relationship with its 'home' 
country, France. Beginning with the Privy Council's decision in the Labour 
Conventions case95 which upheld the right of the provinces to participate in the 
treaty process when the substance of a treaty involved a matter of concern to 
the provinces, Quebec has sought a degree of independence in foreign rela-
tions. One example of this is the educational exchange agreement (referred to 
as a proces verbal) concluded with France in 1964.96 That relationship was for-
malized in 1965, when the Canadian Government signed a cultural agreement 
with the Government of France. 97 The agreement allowed the Province of 
Quebec to enter into cultural and educational exchanges with France under 
the general authority of the Canada-France agreement which was thus labelled 
an "umbrella agreement" or "[oi cadre. "Quebec subsequently signed various 
agreements with France, but did not always recognize the supremacy inherent 
in the 1965 Canada-France agreement. 98 The tension arose over differing con-
ceptions of the treaty-making implementing provisions of the BNA Act and 
94. "Through the ongoing process of federal-provincial relations, Quebec has come to wield 
·wider powers than the other provinces, because only Quebec has accepted options equally 
available under federal law to all provinces." Smiley, supra note 14, at 208. &e also note 88 supra. 
95. Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, (1937) A.C. 326, noted in 8 
1. L. R. 41 (1935-37). 
The case dealt with the ability of the Federal Government to pass the Weekly Rest in Industrial 
Undertakings Act, 1935, Can. Stat., c. 14, the Minimum Wages Act, 1935, Can. Stat., c. 44 and 
the Limitations of Hours of Works Act, 1935, Can. Stat., c. 63. These acts reflected Canada's ac-
ceptance of the International Labour Conventions. The Privy Council, per Lord Atkin, held that 
under Section 132 o'fthe BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, the provinces must playa part in the 
treaty implementation process where matters of provincial concern were at hand. Section 132 of 
the BNA Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, rested exclusivity of implementation oftreaty obligations 
in the Parliament of Canada only when those duties were undertaken as part of the British Em-
pire, and not in situations which did not involve relations with foreign countries. 
For cases affirming that provinces are autonomous within their areas of delegated concern, see 
Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver General of New Brunswick, [1892) A. 
C. 437; Bonanza Creek Gold' Mining Co. v. The King, (1916) A. C. 566; and In re Regulation 
and Control of Radio Communications, (1932) A. C. 304, noted in 1. L. R. 45 (1931-32). 
96. Atkey, Provincial Transnational Activiry: Approach to a Current Issue in Canadian Federalism, in 2 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 21, at 162 [hereinafter cited as Atkey). 
97. CANADA: DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, Franco-Canadian Cultural Agreement, 17 Ex· 
TERNAL AFF. 513 (1965); Text of Cultural Agreement &tween the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the French Republic, id. at 514. 
98. CANADA: DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, Entente on Cultural Cooperation &tween France 
and (bubtc, 17 EXTERNAL AFF. 520 (1965); Text of Entente on Cultural Cooperation &tween the Govern-
ment of the French Republic and the Government of Quebec, id. at 521. The Entente was not approved by 
the central government until after its execution. &e Atkey, supra note 96, at 162. For a survey of 
Quebec's agreements with other French-speaking countries, ste Government of Quebec, Working 
Paper on Foreign Relations, reprinted in CONFERENCE OF 1968-1969, supra note 15. &e also note 100 
infra. 
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the general limitations of the treaty power. 99 The federal government has 
always maintained that the treaty power is exclusive and has resisted attempts 
by Quebec to make agreements or substantial contacts with other French-
speaking countries. loo 
There are two major barriers that would have to be overcome before a 
delegation of powers could be effected. First, within the present constitutional 
framework, the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that a delegation of the 
legislative and plenary powers reserved to the federal government under Sec-
tion 91 of the BNA Act and the provincial governments under Section 92 is 
unconstitutional. lol Nevertheless, the redistribution of powers requires a con-
stitutional amendment. Delegation of those powers could be effected if all the 
99. Supporters of Quebec's autonomy in foreign relations point to the fact that Section 132 of 
the BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, does not vest the Federal Government with exclusive 
treaty authority. ld. S 132. Moreover, the rule announced in Attorney-General for Canada v. 
Attorney-General for Ontario, [1937] A. C. 326, supports provincial participation in those 
treaties that affect their delegated powers. Finally, recent opinion indicates that Quebec does 
possess some treaty-making authority. See generally Morin, Intmw.tional Law-Treaty Making Power: 
Constitutional Law Position oftlu GoIJtrfl1rlnU ofQUllbec, 4-5 CAN. BAR REV. 160 (1967); Morin, La Con-
clusion d'Accords Intmw.tionawc par Us Provinces Canadiennes Ii la Lumiire du Droit Compare, 3 CAN. Y. B. 
INT'L L. 127 (1965); Morin, La PolitiqUil ExtirUure du Quebec, 9 ETUDES INTERNATIONALES 281 
(1978). For a criticism of this position, Set Morris, The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma, 
4-5 CAN. BAR REV. 4-78 (1967). 
The Federal Government's position is founded on the fact that under Section 9 of the BNA 
Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vic!., c. 3, power to conclude treaties was vested in the British Crown and 
since that time that power has been progressively transferred to the Parliament of Canada. Id. 
S 9. See notes 29-32 supra. See generally Delisle, Treaty-Making Power in Canada, in 1 ADVISORY COM· 
MITTEE, supra note 21, at 117; Laskin, Tiu Provinces and Intmw.tionaIAgreements, in id. at 103; Rand, 
International Agreements Between Canadian Provinces and Foreign States, 25 U. TORONTO FOR. L. REV. 
75 (1967); McWhinney, Tiu Constitutional Competmce Within Federal Systems for Intmw.tional 
Agrummts, in 2 ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 21, at 121 [hereinafter cited as McWhinney]; 
CANADA: DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, The Provinces and Treaty-Making Powers, 19 EXTER-
NAL AFF. 306 (1967). 
. 100. For a review of Quebec's efforts at treaty-making with Gabon, Tunisia, Nigeria and 
France, see McWhinney, supra note 99, at 125-32, 14-2-52. 
101. See Attorney-General of Nova Scotia v. Attorney-General of Canada, [1950]4- D. L. R. 
369. The case dealt with the constitutionality of Bill No. 136, "An Act respecting the delegation 
of jurisdiction from the Parliament of Canada to the Legislature of Nova Scotia and vice versa. " 
The Bill would have allowed the Parliament of Canada to pass certain regulations dealing with 
employment practices which would have conflicted with the exclusive powers of provincial 
legislatures under Section 92 ofthe BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vic!., c. 3. Nova Scotia would have 
had certain powers of the Parliament of Canada delegated to it in the same field. C.J. C. Rinfret, 
writing for the majority, declared: 
[N)o power of delegation is expressed either in Section 91 or Section 92, nor indeed, is 
there to be found the power of accepting delegation from one body to the other . . . 
[n)either legislative bodies, federal or provincial, possess any portion of the powers 
respectively vested in the other and they cannot receive it by delegation. In that connec-
tion the word "exclusively" used both in Section 91 and Section 92 indicates a settled 
line of demarcation and it does not belong to either Parliament, or the Provinces to con-
fer powers upon the other. 
4- D. L. R. at 372. See also Re Initiative and Referendum Act, (1919) A. C. 935. 
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provinces agreed to satisfy Quebec's demand for greater autonomy. A delega-
tion of powers amendment could also be drafted to permit other provinces 
greater autonomy. In the alternative, the central government could effect a 
transfer of some of its legislative powers to the executive rather than the 
legislative branch of government in Quebec. 102 This would succeed in cir-
cumventing both the inherent anti-delegation provisions of the BNA Act and 
the need for a formal constitutional amendment. Whichever method IS 
chosen, delegation is not an easy task, as evidenced by the experience of 
Australia. 103 
The second barrier to a delegation of powers defies resolution at this time: 
opposition to the plan by supporters of Quebec's independence. The P. Q. has 
never considered a form of special status to be a viable option. This is 
predicated upon the inherent inconsistency of a proposal that would allow for 
two sovereign governments to operate within the same political union. lOt It is 
clear that the separatists desire to form their own government on their own 
terms. Although the idea could be revived if the P. Q. falls from power, special 
status is not a practical solution given the party's present political strength.' 
III. THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE CASE OF QUEBEC 
A. Early Formulation of the Doctrine 
The initial formulation of the theory of the right of self-determination was 
developed in the period following World War I, when the need to reorganize 
the European continent provided the opportunity to adjust national borders, 
taking into account the desires of national minority groups. The most visible 
proponent of national self-determination, Woodrow Wilson, was concerned 
primarily with restructuring the existing political order so as to prevent the 
eruption oflocalized disputes which might again lead to world war. 105 Prior to 
102. The Supreme Court of Canada has allowed delegation to executive and administrative 
bodies. See Mayer, supra note 41, at 65. 
103. Section 51 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900,63 & 64 Vict., c. 
121, outlines the general delegation powers. In practice, the scheme has been unworkable 
because of the inability of the various states of Australia to agree on powers to be delegated. See 
WHEARE, FEDERAL, supra note 22, at 248-50. 
104. See note 74 infra. See also OPTION FOR QUEBEC, supra note 18, at 35. The notion of special 
status is rejected out of hand. See id. at 10; NEW DEAL, supra note 7, at 42-43. 
105. For sources on Wilson's approach to self-determination, see general{y R. BAKER & W. 
DODD, 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON: WAR AND PEACE 155-62 (1925); Woolsey, 
Self-Determination, 13 AM.]. INT'L L. 81 (1919); Pomerance, The United Stales and Self-Determination: 
Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM. ]. INT'L L. 1 (1976); R. LANSING, THE PEACE 
NEGOTIATIONS: A PERSONAL NARRATIVE, 93-105 (1921). A territorial adjustment was hoped for 
"in substance (involving) particularly the destiny of the peoples in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, 
and the Middle East who were directly affected by the defeat or collapse ofthe German, Russian, 
Austro-Hungarian, and Turkish land empires." Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM.]. INT'L L. 
459, 463 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Emerson]. However, theory diverged from practice, and 
States were not created on the basis of self-determination. See Sinha, Is Self-Determination Passe? 12 
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this effort, the doctrine suggesting that the national aspirations of a people 
should be recognized and acted upon had not yet been accorded formal atten-
tion as a guiding principle of international law . "The crucial innovation after 
World War I was self-determination's elevation to the status of an interna-
tional touchstone of governmental legitimacy which could properly be en-
couraged or even enforced by the international community. "106 
However, at that time in the doctrine's formation, there existed no ac-
cepted formula to determine at what point national groups should be allowed 
to exercise the right to determine their own fate. 107 A purely doctrinal applica-
tion contained the potential for the creation of a nearly unlimited number of 
small States within existing independent States. The danger to vested interests 
inherent in that possibility impeded the development and the acceptam:e of the 
doctrine in a world still dominated by colonial structures. lOB During the period 
between the world wars, the question of the limits of the doctrine's applicabili-
ty were not effectively resolved in the League of Nations. I09 
B. Development of the Doctn'ne in the United Nations 
The Charter of the United Nations makes direct reference to self-
determination in Articles 1(2)110 and 55,111 and mentions the principle in-
COL.J. TRANSNT'L L. 260, 267 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sinha). The view of classic writers in 
international law as to the principle of self-determination is reviewed in Dumbauld, Independence 
Under InlmullionlJl Law, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 425 (1976). 
106. BUCHHEIT. supra note 79, at 4. 
107. In 1920, the Aaland Islands sought annexation to Sweden, having been under the 
technical control of Finland. A League of Nations commission of three international jurists was 
instructed to report on the request. In the jurists' view, 
[t)o concede to minorities of either language or religion, or to any fractions of the 
population, the right of withdrawing from the community to which they belong, 
because it is their wish or good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within 
States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be to uphold a theory in-
compatible with the very idea of a State as a territorial and political entity. 
The Aaland Islands Question: Report Submitted to the League of Nations, LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
Doc. B. 7. 21/68/106 (1921). For the Islander's response to the Commission's position, see Aaland 
Islands, 7 LEAGUE OF NATIONS PUBLICATIONS (POLITICAL) c. 138 (1921) (response dated June 19, 
1921). 
108. Similar difficulties took place in the United Nations in its study of the reach of self-
determination. See notes 113-129 infra and accompanying text. See also Gregory, The Neutralization 
of tht Aaland Islands, 17 AM.J. INT'LL. 63, 76(1923). 
109. Set BUCHHEIT. supra note 79, at 60-73. 
110. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2) reads: ''The Purposes of the United Nations are: (2) To develop 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determinations of peoples and to take appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." /d. 
Id. 
111. U.N. CHARTER art. 55 reads in part: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary 
for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. 
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directly in Articles 73112 and 76.113 Self-determination was a phrase 
understood by the majority of the delegates to the San Francisco Conference 
as an expression ofthe need to eliminate colonialism. lit The colonial condition 
was not only apposite to the flourishing doctrine of human rights which in-
cluded, inter alia, freedom from political oppression, but presented the 
possibility offrequent and bitter local conflicts. The United Nations has com-
mitted itself to the eventual elimination of colonial political structures. 115 
In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,1I6 while not 
specifically mentioning the words 'self-determination' pronounced that "the 
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government."117 This 
section implied that these 'peoples' were vested with the right to form new 
/d. 
112. U.N. CHARTER art. 73 reads in part: 
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the ad-
ministration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these ter-
ritories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust to promote to the utmost . . . the 
well-being of the inhabitants of these territories and, to this end 
b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the 
peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institu-
tions ... 
113. U.N. CHARTER art. 76 reads in part: 
"The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, ... shall be: 
b. to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of 
trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as 
may be appropriate .... " /d. For discussions of Articles 73 and 76 of the U.N. Charter, see S. 
CALOGEROPOULOS-STRATlS, LE DROIT DES PEUPLES A DISPOSER Eux-MEMES, 107-13 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as CALOGEROPOULOS-STRATlS); I. CLAUDE JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES, 
THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 349-76 (4th ed. 1971); Haas, 
The Reconciliation of Conflicting Colonial Policy Aims: Acceptance of the League of Nations Mandate System, 
6 INT'L ORG. 521 (1952); C. TOUSSAINT. THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
(1956); D. HALL, MANDATES, DEPENDENCIES AND TRUSTEESHIP (1948). 
114. See generally Hass, The Attempt to Terminate Colonialism: Acceptance of the United Nalions 
Trusteeship System, 7 INT'L ORG. 1 (1953); Good, The United States and the Colonial Debate, in 
ALLIANCE POLICY IN THE CoLD WAR 224-70 (A. Wolfers ed. 1959); Mustafa, The Principle of Self-
Determination in International Law, 5 INT'L LAw. 479 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Mustafa); 
BUCHHEIT, supra note 79, at 7; Sinha, supra note 105, at 271; Friedlander, Self-Determination: A 
Legal-PoliticalInquiry, 1 DET. C. L. REV. 71 (1975)[hereinafter cited as Friedlander); R. HIGGINS, 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS 100-03 (1963); Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization, in 9 OCCA-
SIONAL PAPERS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Dec. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Emerson, Self-
Determination I. 
115. See generally Jacobson, The United Nalions and Colonialism: A Tentalive Appraisal, 16INT'L 
ORG. 37-58 (1962); D, WAINHOUSE, REMNANTS OF EMPIRE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE END 
OF COLONIALISM (1964); A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 95-225 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SUREDA); U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-
DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972) [hereinafter cited as UMOZURIKE); 
CALOGEROPOULOS-STRATIS, supra note 113, at 115-33; Emerson, Self-Determination, supra note 
114, at 42-62. 
116. G. A. Res. 217, 3 U. N. GAOR, Supp. (No.2), 71, U. N. Doc. Al810 (1948). 
117. /d. at 75, art. 21(3). 
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political unions through a clear expression of their will. Shortly thereafter, the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and the Committee on 
Human Rights were given the task of specifying the means by which 'peoples' 
could accede to power through the exercise of the right to self-
determination. 118 
The focus of the ideological struggle among the various viewpoints centered 
on how to affirm self-determination for colonial peoples without promoting 
numerous separatist demands emanating from a non-colonial context.1I9 In 
1966, the General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural RightsI20 and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,l2I both of which affirmed that "[ a]II people have the 
right to self-determination. By virtue of the right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment."122 
The struggle over the extent to which the right could be applied is reflected 
in the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples 
and Countries. m Paragraph 2 of the Declaration contains precisely the same 
wording with respect to the right of self-determination that is used in the 1966 
international covenants. 124 However, as will be discussed in Section D of this 
Comment, the right of self-determination may be severely curtailed as a result 
of an apparent prohibition of actions that would disrupt existing States. 125 
118. Inclusion in the Internal Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights of an article relating 
to the rights of peoples to self-determination, G. A. Res. 545, 6 U. N. GAOR,Supp. (No. 20): 
36, U. N. Doc. Al2119 (1952). The idea of setting up such a Commission was first proposed in 
1946. See Election of the Members of the Economic and Social Council, G. A. Res. 4,1 U. N. 
GAOR, Supp. (No.2), 4, U. N. Doc. A/64 (1946). For a review of the U.N.'s early history with 
respect to declarations of human rights, see Comment, Entry Into Force of the International Covenants 
on Human Rights and the Optional Protocol /0 the Inlernah'onal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 70 
AM.J. INTL L. 511 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Entry into Force]. 
119. See BUCHHEIT. supra note 79, at 83-85. 
120. G. A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), 49, U.N. Doc. A/6319 (1966) 
[hereinafter cited as Economic Covenant]. 
121. G. A. Res. 2200,21 U. N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16),52, U. N. Doc. Al6316 (1966) 
[hereinafter cited as Political Covenant]. 
122. See Economic Covenant, supra note 120, art. 1(1); Political Covenant, supra note 121, art. 
1(1). The Covenants did not enter into force until January 3, 1976. See Entry into Force, supra note 
118, at 512. 
123. G. A. Res. 1514, 15 U. N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16),66, U. N. Doc. Al4684 (1960) 
[hereinafter cited as 1960 Declaration]. 
124. 1960 Declaration, id. art. 2 states: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social, and cultural development." /d. See Economic Covenant, supra note 122, art. 1(1), Political 
Covenant, supra note 121, art. 1(1). 
125. See the 1960 Declaration, para. 6, which reads: "Any attempt at the partial or total 
disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the Pur-
poses and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations." Id. See also notes 136-140 infra. 
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In 1970, th~ Declaration on Friendly Relationsl26 reiterated the right of self-
determination, but also called on member-States to assist in the promotion of 
legitimate efforts to achieve self-determination. 127 Similar to the 1960 Declara-
tion, this Declaration adhered to the principle of territorial integrity with 
respect to a claim of self-determination,128 thus, limiting the extent to which 
the right could be invoked. Territorial integrity was qualified in the text of the 
Declaration. 129 
Whether or not Quebec could advance a legitimate claim to self-
determination under the aegis of the declarations of the United Nations is 
dependent upon the traditional limitation of the right to colonial peoples and 
the relationship between the right of self-determination and secession. 
C. Traditional Limitation to the Colonial Context 
The majority of countries initially approving the United Nations Charter 
conceived that self-determination would only apply in those limited situations 
in which groups were politically and economically dominated by an alien 
ruling power .130 It is not as clear that such a uniform view can be ascribed to 
the General Assembly's membership at the time of the announcement of the 
126. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G. A. Res. 2625, 
25 U. N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), 121, u. N. Doc. A/5217 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 
Declaration). An Optional Protocol was adopted the.following year, which re-affirmed the prin-
ciples of the 1970 Declaration supra. See Importance of the Universal Realization of the Right of 
Peoples to Self-Determination and of the Speedy Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples for the Effective Guarantee and Observance of Human Rights, G. A. Res. 
2787,26 U. N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29),82, U. N. Doc. N8543 (1971). That resolution has been 
affirmed in the following resolutions of the same title: G. A. Res. 2955, 27 U. N. GAOR, Supp. 
(No. 30),63, U. N. Doc. A/8936 (1972); G. A. Res. 3070, 28 U. N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30), 72, 
u. N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G. A. Res. 3246, 29 U. N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29),87, U. N. Doc. 
A/9866 (1974); G. A. Res. 3382, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30), 84, u. N. Doc. Nl0309 
(1975); G. A. Res. 31/34,31 U. N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30), 93, u. N. Doc. A/311291 (1976); G. 
A. Res. 32/14, 32 U. N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30), 133, u. N. Doc. A/32/318 (1977). 
/d. 
127. See 1970 Declaration, supra note 126, para. 2. It reads in part: 
Every State has the duty to promote, through joint or separate action, the realization 
of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with 
the provisions of the Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carry-
ing out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter . . . 
(b) To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely expressed 
will of the peoples concerned. 
128. [d. Para. 7 states in part: "Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign or independent States . . . ." /d. See also notes 
181-187 infra and accompanying text. 
129. See note 133 infra. 
130. See notes 114-115 supra. 
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1960 and 1970 Declarations. 131 However, it is possible to draw inferences as to 
intent from textual interpretation and subsequent practice. 
Paragraph 1 of the 1960 Declaration prohibits the domination and exploita-
tion of 'peoples' as a violation of human rights,132 and expands on the 
Assembly's concern for those rights by proclaiming that member-States must 
avoid inteference in the affairs of other countries and respect the 'peoples' 
sovereign rights. 133 This provision is wide in scope. "An important aspect of 
the resolution is that it does not restrict the principle of self-determination, but 
extends the principle to all peoples. Both the preamble and the operative part 
of the resolution in effect refer to self-determination as a doctrine of universal 
applicability."134 Nevertheless, even if one accepts this liberal interpretation, 
the question of whether self-determination was intended to apply to seces-
sionist movements, is left unanswered. 135 
Paragraph 6 of the 1960 Declaration demands that an already united 
country remain so: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of 
the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible 
with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter ofthe United Nations. "136 On 
the one hand, the language of the paragraph appears to limit the acknowledg-
ment of a secessionist right outside of the colonial context.137 Following this 
approach, Quebec would find little support for a right to secede unless the 
Province could come forward with a claim for relief based upon an alleged 
colonial status, the practicality of which will be discussed below. 138 However, 
131. See Nayar, Self-Detmnination Beyond the Colonial Context: Biafra in Retrospect, 10 TEX. INT'L L. 
J. 321, 335-37 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Nayar); BUCHHEIT, supra note 79, at 85-97; see also 
Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 
AM.J. INT'L L. 713 (1971); Johnson, Toward Self-Detmnination - A Reappraisal as Rtjlected in the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations, 3 GA. J. INT'L & CaMP. L. 145 (1973). 
132. The 1960 Declaration, supra note 123, states: "The subjection of peoples to alien sub-
jugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of human rights, is contrary to the 
Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world-peace and co-
operation." /d. para: 1. 
Id. 
133. /d. Para. 7 states in part: 
All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on 
the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for 
the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity. 
134. Nawaz, The Meaning and the Range of the Principle of Self-Detmnination, 1965 DUKE L. J. 82 
[hereinafter cited as Nawaz). 
135. BUCHHEIT, supra note 79, notes: "It is impossible to know how many statements contain-
ing the phrase "right to self-determination" were assumed by their authors to refer only to the 
process of decolonization and would be significantly recast under the influence of secessionist pro-
posals." /d. at 20 (emphasis in original). 
136. 1960 Declaration, supra note 123, para. 6. 
137. See Emerson, Self-Detmnination, supra note 114, at 30. 
138. See notes 160-168 infra and accompanying text. 
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it is possible to regard the paragraph as indicative of the desire of the United 
Nations to prevent member-States from interfering, either in support of or in 
opposition to disaffected elements, in countries actively engaged in the process 
of decolonization. 139 This view is bolstered by the principle of non-interference 
in Paragraph 7.140 However, the view does not support Quebec's claim to self-
determination since it simply states that third parties could not interfere with 
the Province's aspirations. 
The self-determination language in the 1970 Declaration mirrors that of the 
1960 Declaration, but with one important difference: the limitation placed 
upon the principle of territorial integrity. Paragraph 7 affirms that integrity 
but adds that it is to apply only to those "sovereign and independent states 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principles of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples as described previously and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour." U1 The precise scope of this limitation 
is important because in a literal sense the words suggest that a showing of un-
equal treatment for a particular race or group would activate a right of self-
determinaton. French-Quebeckers believe that they can demonstrate this.142. 
One view of the degree of the limitation is based on the effective control a 
government has over its territory. Generally, if a State possesses a representa-
tive government that serves all of the people within its territory, then it may be 
presumed to fulfill the requirements of the principles of equal rights and self-
determination towards them.143 However, this approach is inadequate in 
several respects. It does not address the manner in which control is exercised 
given the specific call for equal rights within the 1970 Declaration; 144 rights 
which are not de facto preserved within the vague concept of 'representative 
government.' The presumption that representative government per se satisfies 
139. Compare note 137 supra with Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public Order: Communiry 
Response to Territorial Separation, 16 VA.]. INT'L L. 779 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Suzuki]. Suzuki 
believes that Paragraph 6 outlined 
[t ]he expectation shared by all participants in the Declaration, ... that colonial powers 
should have avoided intervention in a decolonization process that had caused unfor-
tunate partitions, such as the Ewe separation, the Somali separation, "Mauritaniza-
tion," and Katanganization .... The participants were primarily concerned with aver-
ting possible attempts at disruption by third parties, particularly by colonial powers. 
/d. at 842-43 (emphasis added). 
140. See note 133 supra. 
141. 1970 Declaration, supra note 126, para. 7. 
142. See notes 11-12, 82 supra. 
143. This was the substance of proposals submitted by the United States and Great Britain to 
the Special Committee on Friendly Relations. See Report of the Special Committee on Principles 
oflnternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, 24 U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. (No. 19),50-52, paras. 140(B), 142(4), U. N. Doc. A17619 (1969). 
144. 1970 Declaration, supra note 126, para. 1. It states in part: "By virtue of the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... all peoples have the right to freely determine 
. . . their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development." /d. 
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the obligation of States under the Declaration, was rejected expressly by the 
draftsmen. us 
A more reasonable view, based on the language of Paragraphs 3 and 7 of the 
1970 Declaration, removes the presumption that a de facto representative 
government satisfies the demand placed upon member-States. Emphasis is 
placed on representative government as a continuing processU6 and the re-
quirement that States 'promote' and 'respect' equal rights and self-
determination as described within the text of the Declaration. U7 This inter-
pretation gives greater force to a claim for secession from an existing State 
since it implies that a member-State is required to recognize and act upon the 
aspiration of 'peoples' living within its borders. 
In the context of Quebec, this viewpoint reflects the opinion of various con-
stitutional commissions over a period of time that the Province should be 
allowed to secede if voters in the Province so choose. us However, when 
Canada became a signatory of the 1970 Declaration, it was made clear that she 
understood the Declaration to apply solely to the colonial situation. U9 
Despite the seemingly inevitable clash between the principle of territorial in-
tegrity and self-determination, "the former must, under present international 
law, give way to the latter. "150 A limitation upon the right of secession that 
gives priority to the maintenance of territorial integrity over claims to in-
145. BUCHHEIT, supra note 79, at 93 n. 212. 
146. Under this formulation of the principle, if a government does not represent the 
governed, and if peoples within a state are denied equal rights and are discriminated 
against, their right to self· determination will revive. In other words, the right to self-
determination is a continuing right. 
Nayar, supra 131, at 338. See note 153 infra and text accompanying notes 188-192 infra. 
147. See note 133 supra. 
148. See note 69 supra. 
149. "[N)ote that many States that approved the 1970 Declaration, like Canada, did not fail 
to underline in so doing, that in their view the Declaration applied to colonial situations and not 
to causes arising in established States." BROSSARD, supra note 10, at 101 (author's translation). 
!d. 
150. UMOZURIKE, supra note 115, at 187. The author continues: 
There is little disposition to investigate the question of human rights and self-
determination within a member-state; the lethargic attitude toward the Sudan, where a 
civil war had been raging and to Lesotho, where the ruling Basutoland National Party 
seized power after losing the election held in January 1970 are recent examples. 
Former Secretary-General U Thant expresses a different view: 
[A)s far as the question of secession of a particular section of a Member-State is con-
cerned, the United Nation's attitude is unequivocal. As an international organization, 
the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe will 
ever accept, the principle of secession of a part of its Member-State. 
Secretary-General's Press Conference, 7 U. N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 30, 36 (Oct. 1970). 
His view has been specifically criticized because" it risks being out of tune with what may well 
be the next incarnation of self-determination when the peoples now subjected to what they regard 
as alien rule in states composed of heterogenous elements rise up and demand the right to rule 
themselves." Emerson, supra note 105, at 464. For further criticism, see also BROSSARD, supra note 
10, at 106-07; CALOGEROPOULOS·STRATIS supra note 113, at 191-94. 
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dependent political identity would severely limit the instances of the excercise 
of the right to self-determination.!5! 
1. The Practice of the United Nations 
While the 1970 Declaration affords some limited acceptance of a right to 
secession, the practice of the United Nations does not lend a great deal of sup-
port to the idea of secession for Quebec. The dominant view has circum-
scribed the application of self-determination to colonial groups anxious for 
self-rule.!52 By implication, the principle of territorial integrity has been dif-
ficult for claimant States to overcome.!53 It is not likely that this limitation on 
the principle will be significantly compromised in the near future. 154 Even 
151. See Emerson, supra note 105, at 464. 
152. See note 150 supra. See also BUCHHEIT, supra note 79, at 87. For discussions of the above ex-
amples, see generally CALOGEROPOULOS-STRATIS, supra note 113, at 296-301, 342-48; Suzuki, supra 
note 139, at 780-830; BUCHHEIT, supra note 79, at 141-53, 162-76, 198-215; Tiewul, Relations Be-
tween the United Nations Organization and the Organization of African Unity in the Settlement of Sectssionist 
Conflicts, 16 HARV. INT'L L. J. 259, 262-66 (1975) [hereinafter cited as TiewulJ; Ijalaye, Was 
"Biafra" at any Time a State in International Law?, 65 AM.J. INT'L L. 551 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 
IjalayeJ; Panter-Brick, The Right to Self-Determination: Its Application to Nigeria, 44 INT'L AFF. 254 
(1968); C. O'BRIEN, To KATANGA AND BACK: A U.N. CASE HISTORY (1962); Akindele, The 
Organization of African Unity and the United Nations: A Study of the Problems of Universal-Regional Rela-
tionship in the Organization and Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 9 CAN. Y. B. INT'L L. 30 
(1971); Post, Is There a Case for Biafra?, 44 INT'L AFF. 26 (1968); S. CRONjE, THE WORLD AND 
NIGERIA: THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE BIAFRAN WAR 1967 -1970 (1972); Lemarchand, The 
Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Ka/anga Secession, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 404 (1962); G. 
MARTELLI, EXPERIMENT IN WORLD GOVERNMENT: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
OPERATION IN THE CONGO 1960-1964 (1966); Civil War in Pakistan, 4 N. Y. U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 
524 (1971); K. MISRA, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT. 
1971 (1973); Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities-Islamabad 
and Dacca, 66 AM.J. INT'L L. 321 (1972). 
153. See SECRETARIAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE EVENTS IN EAST 
PAKISTAN, 1971: REPORT (1972). In the Committee's investigation of the principle of territorial 
integrity as expressed in the 1970 Declaration, it discussed whether secession could be allowed 
when a group had already exercised their right to self-determination at one point in their history. 
It noted that 
[iJt is a widely held view among international lawyers that the right of self-determina-
tion is a right that can be exercised once only. According to this view, if a people or their 
representatives have once chosen to join with others within either a unitary or federal 
state, that choice is a final exercise of their right to self-determination; they cannot 
afterwards claim the right to secede under the principle of the right to self-
determination. It was on this principle that the claim to independence ... of Biafra in 
the Nigerian civil war resisted. 
Id. at 69. However, the Committee limited the applicability of the 'once only' doctrine by declar-
ing that the right to self-determination is revived if a 'peoples' are denied equal rights. '/d. 
The Committee's interpretation is consistent with the idea that the 1970 Declaration 
establishes rights of a continuing nature and that in order to support a claim for secession, a 
major deprivation of rights must be demonstrated. See note 146 supra and note 182 irifra. For 
criticisms of the 'once only' doctrine, see notes 188-192 infra. 
154. For the United States and British position, see note 143 supra. Canada also expressed 
reservations about the scope of the 1970 Declaration, supra note 1J.26, when she became a 
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newly-formed States on the African continent, do not support the right to self-
determination insofar as the right may impinge on existing political struc-
tures. 155 
It is difficult to predict what the opinion of the United Nations might be 
when confronted with a secessionist claim from a territory that is a part of the 
Western bloc of nations. 156 Despite abuses of human rights in some former 
colonial States, the United Nations has been reluctant to recognize secessionist 
demands.157 This reluctance points out the de minimus impact of the much-
discussed obligation of member-States to be an effective and representative 
government for all peoples within their territories that appears in Paragraph 7 
of the 1970 Declaration. us The presumption in favor of territorial integrity is 
so great that the death of millions of human beings in BangIa Desh in the early 
1970's produced a slow, mixed reaction from the United Nations. 159 In the 
case of Quebec, where any alleged violations of rights are on an entirely dif-
ferent plane in terms of their severity, convincing the international body that 
relief is necessary would indeed be a difficult task. 
2. Characterization of Quebec as a Colony 
If it is possible to characterize Quebec as a colony, then the legitimacy of the 
Province's claim of self-determination will be enhanced significantly. 
signatory. See note 149 supra. A similar reservation was expressed when she agreed to the terms of 
the Helsinki Declaration. 
States with militant minorities, such as Canada and Yugoslavia, felt the need for a 
"balancing element" , which was a euphemism for a limit to the application of the prin-
ciple to national minorities in order to avoid any implication that the principle (of self-
determination) could be used to bring about the dissolution of federated states com-
prised of peoples of different nationalities or other minorities. 
Russell, The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?, 70 AM.]. INTL L. 242, 269-70 (1976). 
155. Secessionist movements have been condemned by the O.A.U. Nayar, supra note 131, at 
326. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity is reproduced at 479 U.N.T.S. 39 (1963). 
Two reasons are submitted for their position. First, the large number of ethnic minority groups 
on the continent, estimated to be 2,000. Nayar, supra note 131, at 327. Second, the preservation 
of existing arrangements as a matter of self-interest. See Ijalaye, supra note 152, at 556 (quoting 
former emperor Haile Selassie); see also Tiewul, supra note 152, at 300-01. 
One writer comments on the meaning of the O.A. U. position: "The principle of self-
determination is apparently now that of selective self-determination, to be applied only in non-
African or perhaps non-Third World situations. In other words, it is purely a political 
concept, .... " Friedlander, supra note 114, at 86 (emphasis in original). See also notes 194-197 
infra. 
156. The O.A.U. position, read literally, applies only to the integrity of the African Conti-
nent. That body may not pay a great deal of attention to the territorial integrity of lands that are 
linked to Africa's former colonizers, Great Britain and France. For an argument that the U.N. 's 
deliberations are essentially ad hoc, see notes 194-197 infra. 
157. For a review of the Biafran, Congolese and the Bangledesh secession movements see note 
152 supra and note 159 irifra, and sources cited therein. For the Somalia-Kenya-Ethiopia and 
Nagas dispute, ste BUCHHEIT, supra note 79, at 176-97 and sources cited therein. 
158. Set note 128 supra. 
159. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 79, at 198-215; see also note 152 supra. 
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However, this is a difficult assertion. Premier Levesque has not lost any op-
portunity to dress Quebec in colonial garb,160 based largely on economic in-
equalityl61 and enforced cultural inferiority. Despite the self-serving nature of 
his remarks, they are partially accurate. Even the 1979 Task Force on Cana-
dian Unity, an avowedly 'federalist' organization, has recognized the 
disparate treatment of French-Quebeckers over the course of Canadian 
history. 162 Others regard the French in Quebec as the only ethnic group in the 
Western Hemisphere that has yet to be liberated from the grasp of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth century European colonial powers. 163 
Yet, Quebec lacks an important feature of classic colonial domination: a 
denial of adequate political representation. 16• There is no significant restric-
tion on Quebec's full political participation in the Confederation. In addition, 
Quebec's separate system of civil laws has been respected,165 and at least three 
of the nine judges sitting on the Canadian Supreme Court must be drawn 
from the Province. 166 
There is some evidence suggesting that Quebec suffers economically from 
Confederation. 167 Further, it cannot be denied that the mentalite dominating 
Anglo and French Canadian history has some similarity to the colonial pat-
tern. 168 The feeling among many Quebeckers is that the present struggle is 
aimed at ensuring their survival as a distinct culture and hence a 'peoples.' 
However, there is little doubt that a list of grievances does not support a claim 
of colonial status. Quebec, first and foremost, is a full-fledged participating 
member of the Canadian Confederation. It is not mer~ly a political colony. 
D. Requisites for a Claim of Self-Determination 
It is clear from the language of Paragraph 7 of the 1970 Declaration and the 
subsequent practice of the United Nations, that a group wishing to claim the 
160. For example, Premier Levesque has stated that "we are a colonial setup and I think that 
colonial setups, in many ways have had their day." Levesque Interview, supra note 12, at 3. "All 
told, it hasn't been such a bad deal, this status of inner colony in a country owned and managed 
by another national entity. Undoubtedly, French Quebec was (as it remains to this day) the least 
ill-treated of all colonies in the world." Levesque, Independent QUI!bec, supra note 74, at 737. See also 
BROSSARD, supra note 10, at 223-26; R. BARBEAU, LE QUEBEC: EST-IL UNE COLONIE? (1962). 
161. See notes 12, 18 supra. 
162. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 23-25. 
163. J. HARBRON, CANADA WITHOUT QUEBEC (1970) [hereinafter cited as HARBRON). The 
author discusses Spanish and Portuguese liberation movements in the Americas and mentions 
that French-Quebec's efforts at independence should be viewed as part of this continent's 
historical evolution. /d. at 13-38. 
164. BNA Act, 1867,30 & 31, Vict., c. 3, arts. 22, 40, 71-73, 86-87, 92; BNA Act, 1915,5 & 6 
Geo. 5, c. 45, art. 1 (ii). 
165. Se. notes 5-7 irifra. 
166. See The Supreme Court Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 259, S 6 (1952). 
167. See notes 12, 18 supra. 
168. "From the psychological point of view and perhaps even from a socio-cultural viewpoint, 
the majority of English-Canadians and the m~ority of French-Quebeckers conform remarkably 
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right of self-determination must demonstrate a wholesale deprivation of basic 
rights. This standard is not met by reference to ethnic distinctiveness. 
The mere claim of a particular form of self-determination, such as 
independence, does not make it ipso facto a question of self-
determination in international law. The action of the government 
complained of must amount, in the words of the committee of 
jurists, to a manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power, to 
the disfavor of a section of the population. 169 
Presumably, if a substantial question existed as to the treatment accorded a 
particular group, a claim of self-determination could be asserted. That group 
would be required to demonstrate the exhaustion oflocal remedies. 170 Several 
characteristics are necessary before a claim of self-determination can be ad-
vanced by a group. 
1. Composition of Groups or Peoples 
For a proper claim of self-determination, the complaining group must 
possess features which identify a separate political grouping and a cultural 
uniqueness, e.g., compatible basic values, unbroken links of communication, 
an expanding elite, and mobility. 171 Features of distinct political groups in-
clude a centralized population, majority status in a particular territory, 
established territorial boundaries, the desire to live as one and the existence of 
a political organization. 172 The third element, essentially an indicator of na-
tional consciousness, has been regarded as an indispensable element for a 
proper claim of self-determination. 173 
There are a number of objective criteria that can be employed to determine 
whether a national consciousness does exist. These criteria include elements of 
a racial, historic, geographic, ethnologic, economic, linguistic and religious 
character. 174 Language, culture and history are the foundations for determing 
well to the portraits of colonizers and colonized," BROSSARD, supra note 10, at 226 (author's 
translation) , 
169, UMOZURIKE. supra note liS, at 196. 
170. See id, at 199; 1. DELUPIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 17 (1974), 
171. K. DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 108-12 (1969). Set also List of Factors 
Indicative of the Attainment of Independence or other Separate System of Self-Government, G. 
A, Res. 742,8 U. N. GAOR, Supp, (No. 17),21, U. N. Doc, Al2630 (1953). 
172. BROSSARD, supra note 10, at 108-09. 
173. National consciousness, 
[W]hen active, ... constitutes a bond between the members of a group in regard to the 
pursuit of certain aims, the foremost of which is a striving for a national personality. 
When the latter is dominant, the group, as a whole, desires to have a separate identity, 
to be sovereign among other peoples by means of a separate and independent status. 
H.jOHNSON, SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS 21 (1967) [hereinafter 
cited as JOHNSON]. 
174. BUCHHEIT, supra note 79, at 10. 
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whether a distnct populace exists. Language is by far the greatest differen-
tiator. 175 
The question of whether Quebec can legitimately claim a right to self-
determination is based pn the degree to which the 'people' of Quebec are held 
to satisfy the objective criteria mentioned above. As has been seen, the 
Quebecois do meet many, if not all, of these objective criteria. 176 They adhere to 
a separate language, church, and legal tradition. 
History, language, law, ethnicity, feelings and politics render 
Quebec at once a society, a province and the stronghold of the 
French-Canadian people. Taken together, these factors produce in 
the Quebecois a vision of Quebec as the living heart of the French 
presence in North America ... (t)he shared desires, aspirations 
and even fears of the collectivity provide perhaps the most com-
pelling evidence in support of Quebec's cultural distinctivenesY7 
There is little doubt that the French inhabitants of Quebec do constitute a 
'people' for purposes of invoking a claim of self-determination. 
2. Additional Requirements for a Secessionist Claim 
There has been a reluctance on the part of members of the internationl com-
munity to allow a claim of self-determination when the question of secession is 
involved. 178 Although no principle of international law bars all secessions,179 
there are greater burdens imposed on a 'people' desirous of withdrawing from 
an existing State. When a request for secession from an existing State is ad-
vanced, the factors of ethnicity and language are not as supportive of a claim 
for relief as in the case of colonial self-determination. The distinct culture is 
regarded as having certain political and other rights within their existing 
State. Thus the need for relief is less severe. 180 
These additional requirements include consent of the State from which 
175. "Historically, since the nineteenth century, language has served as the point of departure 
for nearly all the seizures of consciousness and the majority of the definitions of communities and 
nationals." BROSSARD, supra note 10, at 66-67 (author's translation). 
176. See notes 3-4 supra. 
177. TASK FORCE,supra note 3, at 24-25. For a discussion of Quebeckers as a 'people', see Note 
Self-Determirw.tion in the Post-Colonial Era: The Case of Quebec, 1 A.S.I.L.S. INT'L L. J. 47, 49-51 
(1977). 
178. See notes 153-159 supra. 
179. UMOZURlKE, supra note 106, at 199. 
180. While members of national minorities have political rights, they do not necessarily have 
the right to carve out a State. See JOHNSON, supra note 173, at 57. The former Prime Minister of 
Canada, M. Trudeau, is of the belief that ethnicity is not an adequate basis for a claim to in-
dependent status, finding that" a state that defined its function essentially in terms of ethnic at-
tributes would inevitably become chauvanistic and intolerant." TRUDEAU, supra note 3, at.4. 
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secession is sought, 181 or, alternatively, sufficient reasons, which allege a 
denial of basic rights, to leave the State. 182 Further it must be shown that 
separation will not cause the remaining State undue economic and political 
harm. 183 In addition, one school of thought asserts that the right of secession 
cannot be invoked when a 'people' have at some point in their history chosen 
the terms of their political allegiance. The first two issues have been addressed 
supra, 184 while the latter two will be discussed infra. 
The secession of the Province of Quebec would divide Canada into two 
parts, cutting the Maritime Provinces off from the rest of the country. In cases 
of secession since 1945, no similar geographical separation has occurred. In 
other instances, the separating region was located at an extremity of the af-
fected country or was apart from the mainland entirely.185 In response to this 
concern, however, the P. Q. has indicated that it intends to allow the free 
passage of goods and people. 186 Given the sophisticated transportation system 
that already serves the area, the concern is less important than it would be in a 
less developed country. Moreover, the P. Q. has expressed its desire to form 
an economic association with the rest of Canada. 187 If Ottowa and the other 
provinces refuse to negotiate the question of economic association, they will 
undermine the significance of the argument that the physical break-up of the 
country would cause undue hardships. 
181. For discussion of the difficulties Quebec would encounter in attempting to convince the 
other provinces to allow it to secede, see notes 18, 68-92 supra. 
182. What seems to be required is a denial of political freedom anellor human rights as a 
sine qua non for a legitimate separatist claim. This does not of course totally invalidate 
the claims of, for instance, the French Canadians, American Blacks, Welsh or 
Bretons, but it does suggest that their respective States are under no obligation im-
posed by international law to recognize their demands beyond providing protection 
for human rights ... 
BUCHHEIT, supra note 79, at 94. For a summary of Quebec's arguments in this regard, see notes 
11-12,82 supra. 
183. See, e.g., Bowett, Self-Determination and Political Rights in Developing Countries, 1966 AM. 
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 129. He suggests that secession "cannot result in a miniscule without 
economic or political viability, and the remaining State cannot be deprived of its economic 
base." !d. at 131. For a discussion of the application of this principle to Katanga, Pakistan and 
Biafra, see Suzuki, supra note 139, at 824-26. But see Richardson, Self-Determination, International 
Law and the South African Bantustan Policy, 17 COLUM.J. TRANSNT'L L. 185 (1977). It is argued that 
"[t]he case of Katanga indicates that the legality of such actions [secessionist] is not to be deter-
mined by the economic viability of the breakaway territory but by an authoritative assessment of 
the legitimacy, under international community policies, of the entire process of secession. " Id. at 
202. 
184. See notes 11-12,82,181-182 supra. 
185. "Singapore, Senegal, Katanga, and Biafra were situated at one of the extremities of the 
States concerned .... Syria, Jamaica, Bangledesh and South Rhodesia, were separated com-
pletely from a geographic standpoint, from the rest of the State that they separated from." 
BROSSARD, supra note 10, at 178 (author's translation). 
186. NEW DEAL, supra note 7, at 58. 
187. See note 18 supra. 
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Under the principle that a 'people' can choose their political fate only once, 
"groups do not retain any residual rights of self-determination in the form of 
an option unilaterally to secede from the society and extinguish its 
existence. "188 Such a position is not acceptable for the following reasons. 
First, the provisions of the 1970 Declaration require that a State respect the 
rights of its people on a continuous basis. 189 A United Nations Committee of 
Jurists has interpreted those provisions as implying that, if human rights are 
violated, the right to self-determination is revived. 190 
Second, it is arguable that French-Canadians have never completely ac-
cepted Confederation. At the founding conference of 1864-1865, of the 49 
deputies representing the area of Lower Canada (Quebec), two of whom were 
English, the vote in favor of Union was 27-22.191 To maintain that this in-. 
conclusive vote stand, ad infinitum, as an unalterable commitment to Con-
federation, without the opportunity to determine whether support for the ar-
rangement continues, removes meaning from free choice. 192 
It appears, then, that some of the additional burdens imposed on a 'people' 
wishing to secede from an exising union can be met by the Province. Also, 
Quebec might be able to employ the treaty doctrine of rebus sic stantibus in sup-
port of its appeal. 193 Whether Quebec's claim will be accepted is another ques-
tion, the answer to which ultimately depends on a display of political strength. 
E. Self-Determination - A "Political Doctn'ne" 
Regardless of the appropriateness of Quebec's claim to self-determination, 
it must be observed that the fate of the Province is as much a matter of politics 
as it is of law. The abstract existence of a right is given value only if it can be 
exercised by those wishing to invoke it. It is certain that legality affects the ex-
tent to which a right is enjoyed. Legal support for an avowedly political deci-
188. BUCHHEIT, supra note 79, at 21. 
189. See notes 146 & 153 supra. 
190. See note 153 supra. 
191. See NEW DEAL, supra note 7, at 9. This conflicts slightly with a figure given earlier. See note 
10 supra. There is no apparent reason for the disparity. 
192. See BROSSARD, supra note 10: "In an ever-changing world, that will no doubt be so in the 
future, it is unthinkable that the decision of a group of men, at a given moment, could serve as a 
perpetual tie for their descendants." /d. at 85 (author's translation). 
193. Rebus sic stantibus is an objective rule of law by which a fundamental change of cir-
cumstances, under certain conditions, may be invoked by a party as a ground for terminating a 
treaty. 1 G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 158 (1960). Quebeckers 
would contend that the circumstances under which it signed the Confederation 
'treaty' have changed, warranting their withdrawal from the Union. See note 20 supra. A full 
discussion of the doctrine's applicability to Quebec is beyond the scope of this Comment. See 
generally Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 61 AM.]. INT'L L. 895 (1967). For the doc-
trine's. application to a particular dispute, see Comment, An Examination of the Treaties Governing the 
Far-Eastern Sino-Soviet Border in light of the Unequal Treaties Doctrine, 2 B.C. INT'L& COMPo L. REV. 
445 (1979). 
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sion fosters greater public support for a cause which, in its context, seeks to 
promote the interests of inhabitants. An argument exposing an unequivocal 
legal right authorizing Quebec's separation would unquestionably promote 
support for the Parti Quebecois' effort.194 
Ultimately, "so far as self-determination is concerned, principles and rights 
are usually subordinate to political events and to the hard facts of success or 
failure. People who succeed in establishing themselves as distinct political 
communities generally will secure appropriate international recognition in 
due course."195 Previous examples of national minority efforts indicate that 
the success of a claim is related to the success that a group is able to achieve in 
a display of strength. 196 The decision as to whether a 'people' exists has, in 
practice, been an ad hoc one. 197 
It is not suggested that this ad hoc recognition be the standard by which 
secessionist claims are judged and legalized. Such an approach lacks any 
systematic examination of the validity of their claims. General standards, 
especially those contained in the 1970 Declaration concerning the obligation of 
States to promote and respect the equal rights of all within their borders, 198 of-
fer means through which a claim of self-determination (secession) can be 
assessed. In a world composed of varying political systems, those standards in-
evitably will be applied in various ways. However, predictability and prece-
dent are lost when the events of the moment are permitted to dictate the inter-
national community's response to specific demands. A systematic analysis of 
the problem would require that the Province prepare a dossier outlining their 
objections to the present Union. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has sought to explore the legal avenues available to the 
people of Quebec in their search for sovereignty and to assess the implications 
194. See Mayer, supra note 41, at 61. For discussion of the referendum, see notes 16-19 supra. 
195. TASK FORCE. supra note 3, at 113. "In cases of secession, it is less a question of right than 
of success or failure." JOHNSON, supra note 173, at 50. 
From its Wilsonian origins, the concept of self-determination has been more an instru-
ment of international politics than a humanitarian principle associated with the law of 
nations, ... The principle was distorted in practice, and the net result has been to turn 
it into an ideological weapon which, though purporting to champion popular sovereign-
ty on a global scale, actually serves to perpetuate the deep divisions between the coun-
tries of the Third World and their former colonial masters. 
Friedlander, supra note 114, at 87-88. 
196. "It was not the 'right' of national self-determination which triumphed in East Pakistan 
but Indian military might. Bangledesh succeeded where Biafra failed because it had the strong 
support of an effective political ally." !d. 
197. "We arrive at the conclusion, after considering the contemporary practice of the United 
Nations, that its organs are called upon to pronounce ad hoc if a people - whether they are a na-
tion or not - have the elements necessary to benefit from a proper disposition by that body. 
CALOGEROPOULOS-STRATIS. supra note 113, at 26 (author's translation). See also note 195 supra. 
198. See note 147 supra. 
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of choosing a particular course of action. Some firm conclusions are possible. 
First, Quebec must seek an internal solution to the rift that divides the two 
ethnic groups. The success of the Province's intra-Canadian effort is, for most 
purposes, dependent upon the P. Q. 's ability to rally widespread provincial 
backing and enlist the support of English-Canadians in the rest of the country. 
Whether adequate support exists in Quebec will not be conclusively 
demonstrated until the mid-1980 referendum. Trans-Canadian support will 
probably never be forthcoming, but a reluctant acquiescence on the part of the 
English would have the same effect. Second, it is clear that any solution will 
occur within the political system and will not result from violence. This is 
manifested by Canada's fo;eign policy, which evidences a preference for the 
peaceful resolution of disputes. Finally, the international community will 
fulfill a secondary role. International bodies will become involved only if 
Quebec is unsuccessful in its search for an internal solution and the people of 
Quebec suffer a requisite harm as a result. 
It is suggested that the next decade will witness profound changes in the 
Canadian political system. The English first exercised their control in the 
1760's and solidified it in 1867. Resistance to the structures they erected has 
never been stronger and nothing on the horizon suggests that the resolve of the 
Quebeckers will wane. Whatever form the changes take, Quebec will move in-
exorably forward and it appears likely that Quebec will come to exercise 
greater control over its destiny. 
Marc Arthur Thibodeau 
